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The World Political Forum

**FROM FULTON TO MALTA:
HOW THE COLD WAR
BEGAN AND ENDED**

Moscow 2008

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Edited by
Pavel Palazhchenko
Olga Zdravomyslova

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INTRODUCTION

**Opening Remarks at the International
Conference “From Fulton to Malta: How
the Cold War Began and Ended”**

Mikhail Gorbachev,
*Former President of USSR, President of the Gorbachev
Foundation and the World Political Forum*

I want to express my warm welcome all the guests — from Moscow and from other cities, from Europe and from America. In spite of the fact that we dissatisfied with what is happening in our lives, things change. We shall have to discuss how we can live in this world and what we have to do. It was not an easy job to have convened a conference on this scale. But when the “minds” get together and go ahead with their analytical work, there is progress.

The work principle at the conference and round tables that we have been convening at the Foundation is as follows: a thoroughly convincing scientific approach that increases knowledge and enables us to consider the issues, draw conclusions and make forecasts. The topics selected for this conference weigh heavily on the historical side. This may be correct: at last we can make clear the root causes. All of us, one way or another, have been part of a system, we are still somewhat attached to the past. Facts of history which, I am sure, will be cited here and widen our knowledge of the past processes. This is important. But, I believe, it is necessary the think about how we can break the grip of the past and about the kind of policy that present-day world needs because policy is desperately lagging behind.

Indeed, what can we do in politics if we do not have scientific knowledge and evaluations of the present-day world? It has

changed a lot and continues to change. In the mid-1980s it became necessary to explore the destinies of countries and of politicians, to understand where confrontation and the arms race were taking us. We had to alter the logic of development and offset the horrible process.

An abrupt turn in politics was due to perestroika but great many people in Russia have resented this ... Recently there was the 50th anniversary of the XX Congress of the Communist Part of the Soviet Union, and we are still being told that the Congress was the first act of treason and perestroika was the second act of treason. This shows that we shall have to continue working hard in the intellectual and scientific centers in order to develop an understanding of our very complex world that is changing so fast. This is the objective for historians, philosophers, political scientists, politicians and citizens.

Within mere 10–15 years there appeared giants in the world arena — China, India, Brazil. Their influence on the processes that unfold in the world is so big that no major issue of world politics can be solved without their participation. The Islamic world is going through the process of getting adapted to the challenges of the modern world. It does not want to be on the sidelines of the unfolding processes — and it is being pushed to the sidelines. Sometimes the whole Islamic world — 1.5 billion people — is being labeled, and not only politicians but ordinary citizens of these countries can never agree with this.

Democratic transitions are taking place in the post-Soviet area, in Central and Eastern Europe and in Latin America. We are saying today that the left parties and movement are leading the political process in Latin America. All these factors are very important. In the US, too, the notions of the world seem to be changing. If one keeps in mind the problems of resources and globalization that has become a dominant feature of the contemporary world, it becomes clear that we badly need new approaches to world politics. In a global world — when we face problems like the planetary environmental crisis or the persisting nuclear threat — the issue of the priority of common human interests is gaining in urgency.

Among the participants in our conference there are independent people who possess profound expert knowledge, and we hope we can benefit a lot from this meeting.

Part I. The Sources and the Causes of the Cold War

The Origin of the Cold War

Mikhail Narinsky,

*Professor of History, the Moscow Institute of International
Relations (MGIMO – University)*

The Cold War today is the subject matter of long debates and scientific discussions. What is the Cold War? What is its essence?

In my opinion, the Cold War is a total and global confrontation opposition between two super-powers within a bi-polar system of international relations. The prerequisites for the Cold War stemmed from the fundamental difference in the socio-economic and political systems of the world's leading nations after the defeat of the aggressors' bloc: a totalitarian political regime with the element of a personal dictatorship and a super-centralized plan economy, on the one hand, and a liberal Western democracy and a market economy, on the other. The two powers that prevailed in the post-war world — the USSR and the USA — embodied and epitomized the opposite socio-economic and political orders. The all-out character of the Cold War meant that it enveloped all spheres of society's life: politics, economy, ideology, arms build-up, culture and sport. At the same time, the Cold War included both the periods of a marked aggravation of international tension and its alleviation (détente).

Sometimes the main and even the only cause of the Cold War is attributed to Stalin's policy, to the theory and practice of Stalinism. But the Cold War lasted a quite long time after the "leader of the peoples" was dead. Sometimes it assumed even more aggravated forms. Besides a war — the Cold War, too, for that matter, — is always a confrontation between the two parties,

and inevitably there arises the question about the role that the Western leaders played in launching the Cold War.

Fundamentally different visions of the world setup after the Second World War that the Soviet and US leaders had in their minds played a most important role in the genesis of the Cold War.

The USSR leaders were in favor of cooperation between equal partners endowed with equal rights, in favor of the recognition of Moscow's interests in the security sphere including control over the Soviet sphere of influence. An example of possible accords with the Kremlin was Churchill's "percentages" agreement with Stalin in October 1944 that envisaged a division of the spheres of influence in South-Eastern Europe. The Soviet leader agreed to the British supremacy in Greece having won recognition of the Soviet prevalence in Bulgaria and Romania (as for Hungary and Yugoslavia, the two leaders agreed on the 50% to 50% formula). Characteristically, for some time Stalin was observing these accords. For example, in January 1945 he said to G. Dimitrov about Greek communists: "I would advise Greece against launching this war. The ELAS people (form the National People's Liberation Army of Greece — M.N.) shouldn't have withdrawn from the Papandreou government. They undertook something that they had no strength for. It seems they expected the Red Army to go down south all the way to the Aegean Sea. We cannot do this. We cannot dispatch out troops to Greece. The Greeks did a stupid thing"¹.

While taking the Soviet leaders' approach to the post-war world setup as a point of departure, the deputy foreign minister I.M. Maisky wrote January 1944 in his note "On the Desirable Foundation of the Future World": "The governing principle is the need to safeguard peace for the USSR in Europe and in Asia during the period of 30–50 years ... To this end, the USSR must emerge from the present war with advantageous strategic borders based on the 1941 borders. Besides, it would be very important for the USSR to come into possession of Petsamo, South Sakhalin and the Kuril Archipelago. The USSR and Czechoslovakia must have a common border. Mutual assistance pacts should be concluded

¹ Г. Димитров. Дневник. 9 март 1933 — 6 февраля 1949. София, 1997, с. 460.

between the USSR, on the one hand, and Finland and Rumania, on the other, that would grant the USSR military, air force and naval bases in the territories of the named countries. The USSR should also be granted free and innocent passage through the transit routes to the Persian Gulf via Iran"². This document clearly shows the geopolitical approach to the post-war setup in the world: the importance of borders advantageous to the USSR and the establishment of the Soviet sphere of influence.

The former minister of foreign affairs M.M. Litvinov, while criticizing the Soviet post-war policy, spoke in June 1946 about implementing "outmoded concept of security in terms of geography—the more you've got, the safer you are"³.

The West and the USA, first and foremost, assumed that the principles of economic liberalism and Western democracy should prevail. The US leaders regarded the UN and the Bretton Woods system as a foundation behind the new world order. In 1943 the US Secretary of State C. Hull said in US Congress: "There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the special arrangements ... of the unhappy past"⁴.

At the same time, Washington refused to see the USSR as an equal partner and accept its logic of action in the international scene. G. Kennan wrote in his note in December 1944 that the Soviet leaders never abandoned thinking in terms of the spheres of influence. But American people "have been allowed to hope that the Soviet government would be prepared to enter into an international security organization with truly universal power to prevent aggression"⁵. The implication was that the organization would be established in keeping with the US plans and with the predominant US influence.

² «Источник», 1995, №4, с. 137.

³ V. Zubok, C. Pleshakov. Inside the Kremlin's Cold War. From Stalin to Krushchev. Cambridge, 1996, p. 37-38.

⁴ Цит. по: J.L. Gaddis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941 — 1947. New York, 1972, p. 154.

⁵ Ibidem, p. 157.

Even in February 1946 Charles Bohlen admitted in connection with Kennan's notorious "long telegram" that the existent contradictions with the USSR could be settled so as to achieve a definite modus vivendi on the basis of the division of the spheres of influence in Europe. In this case, however, the role of the UN would have been reduced to an outward appearance with "real power being concentrated in the hands of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union"⁶. But Washington did not want to go back the situation of the Big Three and recognize the USSR as an equal partner.

The fact that after the Second World War the heads of the world's leading nations were relying on force proved an important factor in the inception of the Cold War. Too big was the temptation to solve difficult social and political problems with the use of force. Power asymmetry between the USSR and the USA in the post-war world aggravated the situation.

The USSR entered the post-war period in the laurel wreath of the winner that had defeated fascism. The main instrument now employed by the Soviet leadership was the projection of its military-political power and control over a number of territories (the spheres of influence). Stalin was striving to interpret and use in his own way the accords that the Big Three had achieved in Yalta and Potsdam. For instance, when signing Declaration on Liberated Europe at Yalta Conference Stalin said to Molotov who was quite alarmed: "Never mind, keep working. After some time we can fulfill it in our own way. What matters is the balance of power"⁷.

The United States relied on its predominance in the financial and economic sphere plus on their nuclear monopoly. When the post-war period began, the USA accounted for approximately 35% of the world export of goods, almost 50% of the world's industrial production and more than 50% of the gold reserve. In April 1945 Harriman advised Truman to pursue a more resolute policy toward the Soviet Union. In his opinion, Moscow could not afford a harsh

⁶ Цит. по: J.L. Gaddis. *The Long Peace*. New York, 1987, p. 52.

⁷ Сто сорок бесед с Молотовым. Из дневника Ф. Чуева. Москва, 1991, с. 76.

response because it needed the US support for building back its war ruined economy⁸.

The US atomic monopoly became the chief factor of the post-war world setup. After the Western leaders had received information at the Potsdam Conference on the successful testing of the nuclear device, they made their stand in the negotiations with Stalin by far more rigorous. Later Churchill recalled: all the prospects changed after that, and the West was facing a new factor in the human history: it came into possession of indestructible power⁹. The acquired power increased their desire to impost the US model of the post-war setup in the world. In August 1945 US President Truman and Secretary of State Byrns assured the head of the French government General de Gaulle that world security would be primarily ensured by interaction between the allies within an international organization. Their line of reasoning was this: the United States is in possession of a new weapon — the atom bomb that will force any aggressor into retreat"¹⁰.

This victory in the war consolidated US faith in the supremacy of American values: personal freedom, Western democracy, private property, and market economy. S. Hoffman, prominent political scientist, noted: "The conviction of being not merely a 'city on a hill' but a beacon for the world, allied to an untroubled capability, carried post-war America to impressive successes and some spectacular disasters"¹¹.

Within the framework of these major guidelines there were two likely scenarios of developing relations with the Soviet Union: either to incorporate it in the international community while ensuring that the Kremlin abided by the rules of the game that the West had worked out (F. Roosevelt's deal), or the strongest possible restriction of the USSR's influence along the lines of stern opposition

⁸ См.: J.L. Gaddis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941 — 1947.*, p. 202.

⁹ Цит. по: Г. Алпровиц. *Атомная дипломатия: Хиросима и Потсдам*. Москва, 1968, с. 119.

¹⁰ Archives Nationales (Paris). Papier privées de Georges Bidault. Fonds 457, carton AP-80.

¹¹ S. Hoffman. *The United States and the Soviet Union.*— In: *Western Approaches to the Soviet Union*. New York, 1988, p. 81.

within the framework of interaction (круп H. Truman's line). The US leaders preferred the latter.

An important factor in the inception of the Cold War was the issue of the USSR's sphere of influence: its boundaries, formation instruments, and methods of control.

Stalin employed rigorous measures of its establishment in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: the actions by the Red Army, the actions performed by the Soviet security authorities, repressions against political enemies of communists, and rigged elections returns. An extremely important factor in the development of the situation in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe was the presence of the Soviet Army's contingent in their respective territories. B. Berut, Polish communist leader, recalled his discussion with Stalin in October 1944: "Comrade Stalin warned us by saying that the situation at the given moment was very much in our favor because of the presence of the Red Army in our land. 'You have so much strength on your side now that even if you say $2 \times 2 = 16$, your opponents will say it is true", said comrade Stalin. 'But this will not last forever'"¹². The Soviet leadership embarked upon the policy of establishing pro-communist and communist regimes in the countries within the Soviet sphere of influence, the policy of their Sovietization. During the war I. Stalin drew the attention of M. Djilas, a politician from Yugoslavia, to the peculiar character of the war: "The one who seizes the territory will establish his social order there".

The West applied persistent political and diplomatic efforts in order to alter the composition of governments in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania but was able to achieve but minor, inessential results. In fact, these were the first crises of the Cold War. The West could not achieve more because during the Yalta Conference the Soviet troops were fighting hard on the Oder and seized Budapest, the capital of Hungary, one week after the end of the Crimea Conference.

¹² Цит. по: И.С. Яжборовская. «Согласовать со Сталиным». — В книге: У истоков «социалистического содружества». М. 1995, с. 58.

Indeed, acute debates about changing the composition of the Polish government ended in a compromise in June 1945 at I. Stalin's meetings with H. Hopkins, the representative of the US President. There was an agreement to include five non-communist ministers in the Polish government, and the famous statesman Stanislaw Mikolajczyk got the post of the Deputy Prime Minister. But non-communist minister were obviously a minority (5 out of 19) and could not substantially change the government's political line. A well-known US historian John Gaddis wrote: "But the Stalin — Hopkins agreement in no way altered the balance of power in Poland. The most that could be said for the new government in Warsaw, Time observed, that in forming it Russia had paid lip service to the Yalta pledges and given the US and Britain a chance to save face"¹³. This signified a stage along the line of including Poland in the Soviet sphere of influence.

American and British political and diplomatic demarche toward the governments of Bulgaria and Rumania had even less success. The agreement of December 1945 on the inclusion of two non-communist ministers in each of their governments did not change the main point. J. Gaddis had every ground to say in this connection: "Stalin's concessions did nothing to weaken Russian influence in Eastern Europe — George Kennan aptly described them as 'fig leaves of democratic procedure to hide the nakedness of Stalin's dictatorship'"¹⁴.

Stalin not only had tough control over the Soviet sphere of influence but he also took efforts to expand it to cover the Middle and Near East and Eastern Mediterranean. It was because of the Soviet pressure on Iran that in spring 1946 there emerged the threat of a serious confrontation between the USSR, on the one hand, and the USA and Great Britain, on the other. In the beginning of March British foreign minister E. Bevin said to H. Dalton, a colleague of his in the government, that the advancement of Russian troops to Teheran "meant a war" and that the US was going to dis-

¹³ J.L.Gaddis. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947. New York, 1972, p. 235.

¹⁴ J.L.Gaddis. The United of States and the Origins of the Cold War. 1941-1947, p.280.

patch its navy to the Mediterranean. Indeed, battleship “Missouri” was assigned there. On that day when persuading Harriman to go to London as an ambassador President Truman intimated to him: “It is important. We may be at war with the Soviet Union over Iran”¹⁵.

Right at that time the Soviet Union was bringing vigorous pressure on Turkey in order to obtain its territorial concessions and seeking a key position in control of the Black Sea straits. Later on Molotov recalled: “I was raising the issue of control over the straits from our and the Turkish side. I think this way to put the issue was not altogether right, but I had to perform what I was instructed to do. I raised this issue in 1945 after the war was over. The straits had to be under the safeguard of the USSR and Turkey. This was and untimely and an unfeasible exercise”¹⁶.

Here one should add less famous attempts the Soviet diplomats made while negotiating the peace treaty with Italy in order to secure USSR’s strongholds and trusteeship territories in East Mediterranean.

These geopolitical strivings of the Kremlin faced the West’s fierce resistance. I image it is not right to understate the role of the geopolitical factor in the inception of the Cold War. As a matter of fact, they were fighting over the definition of the boundaries of the Soviet sphere of influence. A very characteristic message came as a cable from Paris from Ambassador A. Bogomolov about a discussion that he had at dinner with his US colleague Caffery in July 1947: “To my question about what he thought about US loans to Greece and Turkey Caffery replied that Greece and Turkey meant oil. We (the USA — M.N.) are prepared to accept that you have enslaved the Baltic states, but you are throwing us out of Hungary and the Balkans and you are moving too close to the Middle East. We are defending our interests. This explains our loans”¹⁷.

The origin of the Cold War is hard to understand unless its psychological dimension is taken into account.

¹⁵ A. Bullock. Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951. Oxford, 1985, p. 236.

¹⁶ 102.

¹⁷ Архив внешней политики РФ. Фонд 129, опись 31, папка 190, дело 3, лист 65.

The “June 22” syndrome was typical of the Soviet leaders. Stalin did deliver the accords he had made with Hitler and Ribbentrop. He did observe the division of the spheres of influence and perform regular shipment of Soviet raw materials to Germany! And what turned out of this? The tragedy of June 22, 1941. The memory of this tragedy boosted Stalin’s distrust and suspicion toward the West. V. Molotov’s reference about Americans is quite typical. In the victory days of 1945 the foreign minister was in San Francisco attending the conference. Later he recalled it: “They congratulated me on May 8. But they did not have much of a celebration. A duly held moment of silence. But there was no feeling ... Not that they didn’t care. They were watchful of us and we were even more watchful of them”¹⁸. Even more watchful indeed!

In summer and in the fall of 1945, immediately after the end of the war in Europe official propaganda was calling on the Soviet people not to relax, to exercise vigilance and fully defeat fascism and all pro-fascist forces. The statement of “Pravda” on September 2, 1945, on the day when the war ended, is just a case in point: “The Second World War is over ... But does this really mean there are no more enemies of peace and security? Does this mean that one can disregard the attempts to sow discord and enmity between freedom-loving nations and, first and foremost, between yesterday’s allies? Certainly not. Vigilance, the greatest possible vigilance — is a primary condition of successful work for peace”¹⁹. Stalinism was consistently imbuing the Soviet people with the mentality of being a “besieged fortress”.

The “Munich syndrome” is typical of the Western leaders. The memory of the Munich Deal with Führer and the ensuing bitter frustration affected their relations with Stalin. The unfortunate experience of accords with Hitler was often extrapolated on the Kremlin dictator. Munich seemed to prove to the architects of the US post-war policy that totalitarian states were insatiably aggressive, that peace was indivisible, the aggression must be resisted everywhere, and that ‘appeasement’ (defined as any substantive diplo-

¹⁸ Сто сорок бесед с Молотовым. Из дневника Ф. Чуева, с. 65.

¹⁹ «Правда», 1945, 2 сентября.

matic exchange totalitarian power) was always folly”, said American political scientists Christopher Layne²⁰.

The line of the US Administration rejecting compromises with the Kremlin while maintaining a steadfast confrontation with the Soviet Union became clear already by late 1945 — early 1946. In January 1946 President Truman wrote in his diary: “Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making. Only one language they understand — ‘how many divisions have you?’ I do not think we should play at compromise any longer”. In his letter to Byrns that dates to the same time he underlined his intention to stop “babying” the Soviets²¹.

W. Churchill continued this political line in his famous speech in Fulton on March 5, 1946. He called for «the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples”. The association was designed to oppose the consolidation of the USSR’s international positions — according to the former premier the Iron Curtain came down on the European continent and divided it along the line running from Stettin on the Baltic Sea to Trieste on the Adriatic Sea. There was no true democracy east of the Iron Curtain. Those countries were governed by police states seeking to establish totalitarian control over society. “This is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up”, proclaimed the speaker with pathos. Churchill’s speech in Fulton was seen as a public declaration of the Cold War on the Soviet Union²². Professor O.V. Pechatnov was very convincing in showing that the toughening of the Soviet foreign political propaganda came as a response to Churchill’s speech in Fulton. The Department of Foreign Policy in the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party issued a strict guideline “to step up work aimed to expose anti-Soviet designs by the English and the Americans”²³.

²⁰ Ch. Layne. The Munich Myth and American Foreign Policy — In: The Meaning of Munich Fifty Years Later. Washington, D.C., 1988, p. 18.

²¹ Цит. по: J.L. Gaddis. The Long Peace. Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. New York, 1987, p. 32.

²² См.: В.Г. Трухановский. Уинстон Черчилль. Политическая биография. Москва, 1968, с. 408-416

²³ В.О. Печатнов. «Стрельба холостыми»: советская пропаганда на Запад в начале холодной войны, 1945 — 1947 — Сталин и холодная война. Москва, 1998, с. 178.

And, finally, one must point out that the Cold War, although fraught with crises and conflicts, did not develop into a big hot war. Neither Soviet, nor US leaders were after a large-scale war aimed to fully crush the opponent. Besides, neither of the sides possessed a crucial balance of power in its favor so as to accomplish this mission. Even during the period of the US atom bomb monopoly a war against the USSR was unwinnable. This was the reason for a definite degree of stability in the bi-polar system of international relations.

However, this was a “bad stability” based on mutual intimidation and the arms race. The Cold War has a past record of severe international crises that posed threats to the whole mankind. This is the reason why we have to be grateful to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev for having broken away from the Cold War theory and practice and for having brought it to an end.

The North Atlantic Alliance: from the Cold War to Detente (1949–1969)

Pavel Gudev,
*Doctor of History, Institute of World History,
Russian Academy of Sciences*

As is known, a number of events in spring and summer of 1948 provided an impetus for the establishment of the military-political alliance between the USA, Canada and Western European countries after the end of the Second World War. Among these events were the coup in Czechoslovakia, the signing of the Finno — Soviet Treaty on Cooperation, the first Berlin crisis and the rumors that the USSR and Norway may conclude a treaty similar to the one signed with Finland¹. Thus, the establishment of the North Atlantic

¹ Лундестаг Г. Восток, Запад, Север, Юг. Основные направления международной политики. 1945-1996. М., 2002. С. 41.

Alliance was designed to neutralize and prevent further proliferation of the Soviet influence in Western Europe. The beginning of the war in Korea seen as an evidence of the preparation for a massive Soviet offensive resulted in the transformation of the bloc, which had so far existed only on paper, into an active organization.

However, the common foundation that rallied the allies within NATO based on the need to oppose the “Soviet threat” was seriously shaken in 1953. “The apparent attitude of the Soviet Union had clearly changed” among the alliance member-countries due to Stalin’s death, said the bloc’s Secretary General Lord Easmy². The signs that the Soviet foreign policy line was eased (the signing of armistice agreement in Korea in July 1953, the beginning of relations normalization with Yugoslavia, readiness to settle the German question, etc.) stimulated discussions about the nature of changes taking place in the USSR.

No wonder that for the majority of the NATO member-countries the recent Soviet moves “suggested a softer, more conciliatory line, which we interpret as being motivated by a desire to create illusion of peaceful intentions in order to gain time to strengthen the Soviet internal position weakened by Stalin’s death”³. But already by 1955 the report entitled «*The Effect on Public Opinion of Soviet Policy and Tactics*» stated that among the allies there were «some expectations that there might be a change and a new era in relations between the East and the West»⁴. The reason for that, according to the authors of the report, was the hard line policy and rough tone of Stalinist diplomacy that convinced the allies in the need to strengthen present defense efforts while the changes in the Soviet foreign policy line may produce exactly the opposite effect. There were apprehensions that the Soviets’ «new look policy» «may produce considerable strengthening of those currents of opinion...which clamour for abandonment of present defense efforts, and call for reduction in military expenditure...” as well as «also give rise to the possibility of a Communist co-participation in national governments...»⁵.

² NATO Archives. C-R (53) 16.

³ NATO Archives. C-R (53) 17.

⁴ NATO Archives. C-M (55) 87. Part II. P. 7-8.

⁵ Ibid.

The XX Congress of the Soviet communist party caused even more confusion in the NATO ranks. The reason was that Khrushchev thoroughly revised Stalin’s theoretical design according to which a new world war was seen as inevitable so long as capitalism existed⁶. Khrushchev resolutely abandoned this model and declared that countries with different social systems not only could co-exist with one another but, moreover, they must follow the line of improving relations with each other. Although “Khrushchev’s version of peaceful co-existence” laid a big emphasis on the continuation of ideological struggle with “imperialism”, it was a serious formal evidence that Moscow had no belligerent intentions toward the West.

And, for example, although the Belgian foreign minister Paul-Henri Spaak said “the change in Russian policy confirmed the rightness of the views of the Atlantic Powers. The NATO powers had long condemned Stalinism...”⁷, the fundamental change in the character of the Soviet threat in no way strengthened cohesion between the allies. One cannot argue, of course, that the results of the XX CPSU Congress brought about a severe crisis within the bloc. But at its Council Session held in May 1956 NATO stated in connection with the recent changes in the USSR: «NATO ... needed to retain its military strength. At the same time, it should modify its tactics and revise its priorities in the light of recent developments»⁸. Besides, NATO decided to set up a special Three Wise Men Committee⁹ to advise on matters of promoting cooperation in the non-military sphere and on rallying cohesion within the Atlantic Community.

But in the fall of 1956 the Suez crisis broke out (when two NATO allies — Britain and France — took action against Egypt that

⁶ Нежинский Л.Н. Чельшев И.А. О доктринальных основах советской внешней политики в годы «холодной войны» // Советская внешняя политика в годы «холодной войны» (1945-1985). Новое прочтение. М., 1995. С. 23-24.

⁷ NATO Archives. CR (56) 20. P. 14-15.

⁸ Ibid. P. 8.

⁹ В его состав вошли министры иностранных дел Италии, Норвегии и Канады — Гаэтано Мартино, Хальвард Ланге, Лестер Пирсон. См: Ministerial Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Paris 4th — 5th May 1956 // NATO final communiqués...: Texts of final communiqués. [1]: 1949-1974. Brussels. 1974. P. 98-100; NATO Archives. CR (56) 23. P. 15.

they had not coordinated with the US that). This not only questioned NATO's further development but also jeopardized the prospects of cooperation between the Atlantic countries. In effect, events in Hungary qualified as a confirmation of the fact that the USSR still posed a direct threat to the West proved extremely timely because they were used as a remedy against centrifugal trends.

By its gradual shift of stress from the Suez developments to the Soviet interference in Hungary the NATO leadership was quite successful in its attempts to iron out contradictions between the allies and used the "Soviet threat" as a unification factor. For instance, when discussing the situation that prevailed in Eastern Europe NATO stated: "this unfortunate deterioration in Western cooperation took place at the very time when the Soviet Union, by the use of force in Hungary...gave evidence of a return to a policy of renewed harshness and open hostility"¹⁰. In connection with this NATO proclaimed its "main purpose ... to develop the ways and means, as well as the will, to prevent crises between members, to unify its members in the face of crises provoked by ..." the Soviet Union¹¹.

As a result, the Final Report submitted by the Three Wise Men Committee to the NATO Council Session in December 1956 considered the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence to be a trick, a tactical maneuver taken by communists in order to demobilize the West and exercise the "export of the revolution" to the developing countries¹². The NATO member-countries were advised to keep on guard when faced with the new form of "penetration". The changes in the Soviet policy after Stalin's death, summarized the Report, did not reduce the need for collective defense. On the contrary, they faced the Alliance with an additional challenge.

Besides, the Report placed particular emphasis on deepening the mechanism of political consultations, which meant more than a simple exchange of opinion. It implied the submission of full infor-

¹⁰ NATO Archives. CM (56) 126. P. 1.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Text of the Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO Approved by the North Atlantic Council Dec. 13, 1956 Cm.: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/bt-a3.htm>.

mation to the NATO Council at the earliest stages when forming the national stand on a particular issue. In effect, all ideological vacillations in the aftermath of Stalin's death and the XX Congress of the Soviet Communist Party as well as centrifugal tendencies caused by the Suez crisis were subject to intent control within NATO.

Thus, Soviet invasion in Hungary put off indefinitely the very opportunity of improving relations between the East and the West, which seemed to have appeared after Stalin's death and strengthened by the concept of "peaceful coexistence" adopted at the XX Congress of the CPSU.

Strange as it might seem, but the new stage in the inception of the process of détente was associated with the acknowledgement of consequences if confrontation were brought to the dangerous brink of a nuclear conflict. The Cuban missiles crisis in the fall of 1962 had a sobering-up effect both on the Soviet and the US leaders and gave an impetus to develop dialogue between the two nations.

Majority of US partners in Europe became more active in promoting the initiative to expand their contacts with the Eastern bloc countries assuming that the "Cuban lessons" changed the character of the "Soviet threat" and that limited cooperation with the socialist community countries would meet the interests of the West. This desire to maintain friendly relations with the Warsaw Treaty states was motivated by the fact that Western allies wanted to become more independent as players in international affairs and, in certain degree, to get rid of US supremacy. This tendency increased while the United States was trying to implement the project of the NATO Multilateral Nuclear Forces (that envisaged the maintenance of the US "nuclear centralism"¹³) and waged the war in Vietnam (many people in Western Europe were concerned that the conflict might expand and did not want to become "hostages" of Soviet-American confrontation).

¹³ Wegner A. Crisis and opportunity: NATO's transformation and the multilateralization of Détente, 1966-1968 // Cold War Studies. Vol. 6. №1. Winter 2004. P. 28.

However, the desire of Western European countries to settle European problems along the lines of bilateral contacts with the Soviet Union was somewhat dangerous in terms of keeping this process under control. When France withdrew from the NATO's military structure and when in summer of 1966 de Gaulle paid a visit in Moscow this was a peculiar statement of the fact that only the weakening of the NATO bloc can put an end to the division of Europe. This fact only increased the growth probability of centrifugal tendencies. In its turn, the North Atlantic leadership while deepening the process of détente was seeking to prevent a decline in its defense potential or a dissociation of the allies from NATO. The idea was finding a framework within which defense policy could match the tendency toward détente.

In effect, the winter session of the NATO Council held in December 1966 adopted a decision initiated by the Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel to analyze the events that took place after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. This was designed to facilitate a critical evaluation of the objectives that the Alliance faced, to revive the Alliance and strengthen cohesion within it.¹⁴ By December 1967 it prepared its Final Report entitled "Study on the Future Tasks of the Alliance" (known more as Harmel's Report). It formulated the idea of a comprehensive policy that was later called the doctrine of "two pillars" for the North Atlantic bloc to rely on in the new international situation.

Its essence was the approval of two basic functions of the Alliance — to safeguard military security and simultaneously to pursue the policy of détente. The Report said: "Military security and a policy of détente are not contradictory but complementary"¹⁵. But the central provision in this strategy was the statement that the achievement of desired results in the process of détente

¹⁴ Ministerial Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Paris 15th-16th Dec 1966 // NATO final communiqués. Texts of final communiqués. 1949-1974. Brussels, 1974. P. 183-184.

¹⁵ Полный текст доклад см.: The Future Tasks of the Alliance. Report of the Council. Ministerial Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Brussels 13th-14th December 1967 // NATO final communiqués. Texts of final communiqués. 1949-1974. Brussels, 1974. P. 198-202; В извлечении см.: Системная история международных отношений в четырех томах. Т. 4. Документы. 1945-2003. М., 2004. С. 223-225.

between the two blocs of states was possible only along the lines of constantly improving the defense policy. The Alliance must be always ready to repeal the threat if détente ended in failure (some sort of a neo-realist formula — peace by means of force)¹⁶.

The NATO member-states must spare no effort, said the Report, to improve relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries while keeping in mind the fact that the continuation of the policy of détente must not lead to the Alliance's erosion. To this end they were advised to follow a coordinated policy: "Currently, the development of contacts between the countries of Western and Eastern Europe is mainly on a bilateral basis" because, according to the authors of the Report, "certain subjects, of course, require by their very nature a multilateral solution"¹⁷.

Thus, Harmel's Report solved a whole range of problems faced by the Alliance. First, the process of establishing relations with the Warsaw Treaty countries was put under control within NATO. This facilitated not only the emergence of a new motivation for the bloc's existence (to promote détente) but also prevented the development of centrifugal tendencies generated by the peculiar emulation between the NATO member-countries when looking for better relations with the East. Besides, having assumed authority in the process of European settlement, the North Atlantic Alliance actually assumed a number of those political functions that had been earlier vested only in the governments of national states — i.e. the Alliance was even more transformed from a defense pact into an organization dealing with a broader notion of "security".

Events in the fall of 1968 convinced the allies that the chosen "double track" strategy was correct. British Defense Minister D. Healey noted that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was as useful for preserving NATO in the next 20 years as the Prague coup in 1948 for the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. British

¹⁶ Кобышев В.Н. Американский неореализм о природе войны. Эволюция политической теории. СПб.: Наука. 2004.

¹⁷ The Future Tasks of the Alliance. Report of the Council. Ministerial Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Brussels 13th-14th December 1967 // NATO final communiqués. Texts of final communiqués. 1949-1974. Brussels, 1974. P. 198-202.

Defense Minister D. Healey noted that the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was as useful for preserving NATO in the next 20 years as the Prague coup in 1948 for the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. British defense minister said that the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia was as useful in terms of preserving NATO in the forthcoming 20 years as was the Prague coup in 1948 for the establishment of the North Atlantic alliance (retranslated from Russian)¹⁸ Again NATO proclaimed the consolidation of its defense capacity as its priority task while, according to the bloc's leaders, the further quest of the ways leading to détente should not reduce cohesion between the allies¹⁹.

In spite of the period of a limited “quarantine” that underscored the condemnation of Czechoslovakia's occupation, the contacts with Eastern bloc countries were soon resumed. The reason for that was the fact that alongside the theoretical existence of a desire to ease international tension there was another, matter-of-fact objective — détente was supposed to facilitate the erosion of unity within the socialist camp²⁰. Besides, both the United States and the USSR had an incentive in mutual agreements on the recognition of the post-war world setup based on the existence of two opposite blocs of states and their military-political entities (the WTO — NATO). The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its crux — the signing of the Helsinki Final Act — in August 1975 practically secured the status quo established in Europe. Probably this was the goal that conditioned success of the process of détente in the late 1960s and early 1970s. But this period was followed by another round of tension and arms race.

¹⁸ Архив внешней политики МИД РФ (далее АВП РФ). Ф. 160. Оп. 33, П. 84, Д. 18, Л.93.

¹⁹ Ministerial Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, Paris 15th –16th Dec 1968 // NATO final communiqués...: Texts of final communiqués. [1]: 1949-1974. Brussels. 1974. P. 160.

²⁰ АВП РФ. Ф. 160. Оп. 33, П. 84, Д. 18, Л. 93.

Discussion presentations

Oleg Pechatnov,

Professor of History, the Moscow Institute of International Relations (MGIMO – University)

In my presentation I would like to go back to the topic of the origin of the Cold War.

If one is to judge by the highest standards, the majority in this room will agree this rivalry, as far as its main features go, seems to have been inevitable just as it happens in human history, especially keeping in mind the difference in the socio-political systems and geopolitical, cultural and civilization factors. But this rivalry could have assumed various forms including those that were less dangerous or confrontationist if the two sides had shown more restraint and readiness for a compromise.

In September 1945 Stalin told Senator C. Pepper it would be difficult to preserve alliance relations after the war but, as Christ had said, “seek and ye shall find”. Indeed, this seeking was not done. It was not done on the Soviet side because Stalin was fully preoccupied with the consolidation mission of his sphere of influence which he wanted to achieve at any cost and in spite the West's resistance. In a collection of documents that I have published there is my description of how Stalin gave Molotov a severe scolding in November 1945. Stalin nearly fired him having claimed that Molotov had been too liberal with the allies: Stalin was encouraging Molotov and the rest of Politburo to adopt what he called a firm line of “reserve and determination” in the relations with the allies.

The United States, too, was not seeking an alternative. Let us compare the situation within the two countries at the end of the war. The USSR was by far weaker than the US, and both Moscow and Washington were well aware of this. The Soviet strength was mainly one-dimensional. This was military strength. The USSR sustained a disastrous loss of life — almost by 90 times more than those of the US. Unprecedented ruination of the USSR in the

war was the cause of the post-war rehabilitation imperative. The second imperative was to safeguard the nation's security mindful of the lessons of Russian/Soviet history and the Second World War.

The area of these priorities was very much visible in the plans of the Soviet leadership: the 1941 borders, a "sanitary cordon in reverse", i.e. a pro-Soviet buffer along the USSR's western borders, a maximum depth of defense along its entire perimeter and a free exit into the world ocean.

Stalin hoped this priority could be achieved while preserving at least more or less steady, if not alliance relations with the West, especially because in the years of the Second World War — incidentally, just like during the First World War — the Western leaders were showing understanding of the USSR's geopolitical requirements and even made overtures for the future in relation to the straits in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean (trusteeship over former Italian colonies) and rendered assistance in the post-war rehabilitation. Indeed, Stalin had enough ground to hope that he could combine the two things.

Steady relations with the West were important to him in order to achieve an amicable recognition of the Soviet sphere of influence and get assistance for the post-war rehabilitation and also to be able to profit by British-US contradictions because if there were a British-US bloc against the USSR no advantages could have been reaped from those contradictions, this being a trump in Stalin's hands.

Still, the maintenance of priority objectives within this geopolitical ambition and the need to provide for the country's security (in his own understanding, of course) were more important for Stalin than preserving relations with the West. Ideology did play its part in this respect.

First, because it distorted the perception of reality and resulted in an underestimation of liberal capitalism's viability and an overstatement of the potential of inter-imperialist contradictions.

Secondly, ideology was pushing the Soviet side to excessive suspicion and distrust, to being "by far more watchful" as M.M.

Narinsky said. That means that ideology was pushing toward an over-reaction to the real and hypothetical threats coming from the West, It was going too far in safeguarding the USSR's security.

During the war the allies, especially Americans, understood this (as is evidenced by documents) and were making allowances for this ideological drawback while trying not to give the Soviet leaders too much cause for suspicion. After the war this courtesy was soon gone for good.

I agree with N.P. Shmelev: Soviet policy in 1945–1946 was definitely tough, forceful and, in some respects, expansionist. Gross mistakes, even from the viewpoint of the then Soviet interests have been committed in Iran and in Turkey. This is true. Besides, it was a leap in the dark. The Soviet side did not disclose its interests. It did not even try to prove the legitimacy of these actions to the West or explain its moves. The reply from the US side was approximately the same.

This caused mutual apprehension and concern. But on the whole my thesis is that the Soviet Union, being the weaker side in this conflict, had less choice and less freedom of action than the West because of the strict limitation on its resources as well as due to the more imperative nature of its security maintenance objectives.

This takes us to the US (and, certainly, British) contribution in unleashing the Cold War. I have worked quite a lot in the US diplomatic and military archives. And I can still remember the despondency that I felt after I had analyzed the documents on the US military planning. The swift strategic reassessment of the Soviet Union that happened just within a couple of months turned the USSR from an ally — for it continued as an ally till the end of the war with Japan — into an enemy.

Already in September and October 1945 the point of departure in the US military plans was the war with the Soviet Union as its chief enemy that was likely in the relatively near future. Had the Soviet policy really changed within these two or three months? Of course, not. The point was not so much the change in the Soviet

behavior but, instead, the change in the policy that the US pursued. And here one faces the question as to the degree of responsibility for the future course of events displayed on both sides. I am in no way justifying the Soviet side. But the USA that possessed greater strength, greater freedom of manoeuvre, a wider choice, greater maturity and diplomatic experience could have afforded a more magnanimous and reserved policy toward its quite recent ally. Indeed, the Americans had a greater safety margin than we did while the Soviet Union at the time was a beginner at the global world politics and needed to be judged by a somewhat milder standard.

Instead of working out at least a partial settlement of the differences or finding a *modus vivendi* there came Fulton, and 1946 was not an accidental date. In spring of that year the military component of the new strategy of deterrence was formulated, and its main message as we now know was not merely to deter the Soviet Union but oust it from the sphere of influence that had expanded after the war (especially in Eastern Europe) and, eventually, to soften and liquidate the Soviet system, to change the regime, if one employs the language that the present US strategy is using.

In our publications US historian of diplomacy F. Logevall and myself — independently of one another and almost simultaneously — came to one and the same question: Truman's Administration did not conduct any meaningful negotiations with the Soviet Union and not even conceived the possibility (as the its in-house documents show) for such negotiations during its internal discussions. Why not?

Logevall explains this with things like the US exceptionalism, its staunch belief in being right and the consequent demonization of the opponent. Any resistance to the US plans, any hostility against the USA was seen as resistance to the cause of progress and, generally, to the rightful cause. He also refers to the fact that the United States lacked experience of being on equal terms within an alliance. This is the reason why it was particularly difficult to recognize the Soviet Union as a new center of power after the war.

I would also add here the low threshold of discomfort shaped during the centuries of absolute security that cost nothing to the US: it had no record of external aggressions or of real threats to its territory. This factor, the low threshold of discomfort, has promoted excessive caution and overreaction not only to real but also to hypothetical, if not often made-up threats. We can still see this in the US policy.

Here one can also add its ideological obsession with anti-communism. Hans Morgenthaw, the patriarch of the school of "realism" in the USA, had a very good reason to write that US anti-communism was stronger than Soviet anti-capitalism because Marxist ideology often catered for the interests of the Soviet state while US ideology of anti-communism was setting many parameters of these interests.

In short, I believe that only after one takes into account all these factors and the behavior on both sides he can understand why the probability of the Cold War — high as it was — developed into its actual inevitability when the War ended.

Thus, relations between the former allies could have been better though this would have required greater efforts. But, on the other hand, they could have been worse indeed. Both sides have displayed certain reserve and prudence at the inception stage of the conflict when it seemed there was no way to settle it other than in military terms. And this, too, is an unquestionably proven historical fact which we must not forget.

Natalia Yegorova,

Professor, Institute of History, Russian Academy of Sciences

Let me shortly dwell on several questions. First of all, this is the problem of extremely slow progress in taking security restrictions off the archive documents. Sometimes access thereto is difficult. The situation with the Russian archives is the main obstacle that all researchers encounter in their study of the Cold War while keeping the proper level of contemporary knowledge.

I represent the Cold War Studies Center in the Institute of World History. We are a small Center, and in our work we are trying

our best to develop international scientific connections, to establish and promote contacts with specialists from regional universities in Russia as well as with the research institutes and universities in Moscow. Therefore, I would like to express common opinion that the unsatisfactory situation with the archives must be addressed as a matter of urgency. Maybe this should be done at the level of a government policy because the laws on the Russian archives have to be changed in keeping with the spirit of time and world experience.

Historians, nevertheless, have covered a lot of ground on the basis of available documents in their study of the period that we are talking about. This was the period of the genesis and development of the Cold War, the so-called Stalin decade in the Cold War. Certainly, ideological dimension of the Cold War was better supplied with documents and was studied better. Its diplomatic history was not so well studied due to the above-mentioned difficulties in obtaining documents from the archives. This has been also the reason why the study of its military aspects has been much worse.

We have already dealt with the complex set of issues that brought about the Cold War. I agree that the causes from which the Cold War originated were manifold. They include ideology, politics, psychology, disparity in the perception of events as well as civilization-based factors. But I would like to note that in spite of different interpretations of the sources of the Cold War the majority of researchers in their definitions of this phenomenon have relied on a common conceptual framework. On the whole, the Cold War appears as a confrontation-based model (or form) of relations between two antagonist socio-political and economic systems under the conditions of nuclear weapons existence. The nuclear factor must be stated without fail when making the definition of the Cold War. Besides, the Cold War was coming about in the situation when two powerful military blocs were being structured. These were NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization about which some speakers were talking about today.

Unfortunately, practically all documents on the Warsaw Treaty in the Russian archives are classified although as Christian

Ostermann said in his report a fundamental work edited by Vojtech Mastny was published in the West. It contains documents on the Warsaw Treaty from Eastern European archives and from the archives of the former GDR. Now Russian specialists are compelled to translate from English into Russian the Soviet documents that they need for their work. Foreign archives have lifted security restrictions on these documents, which are not accessible in Russia. This is how the matters stand.

Since we are facing an inherently difficult situation with Russian archives that leaves an impact even on the study of the early period of the Cold War, historians should turn more often to the problems that allow to combine empirical and theoretical approaches. The problem of the end of the Cold War is a major topical problem in theoretical terms. Besides, the documents in the archive of the Gorbachev Foundation are accessible. I have learnt from the Web site that very many foreign scholars have turned to these documents and books while the Russian specialists must be reproved of not being too active in using available opportunities. Another, no less interesting and topical problem that requires keen attention is the problem of détente. While it can neither be studied without relevant documents, it also implies important theoretical substantiation. Indeed, discussions are still going on as to what détente was. Some scholars assume it was an alternative to the Cold War. So there is plenty for scholars to work on.

Nikita Zagladin,

Professor, Of History, Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

I am very glad we are taking up a study of the causes of the Cold War. This a most contestable problem in the history of the 20th century that is very much charged with ideology. We have inherited from the past a paradigm of looking at it as if to find the parties in fault for the Cold War. In the scientific respect this paradigm is futile. Its adepts are citing points — that look quite convincing in their outward appearance — to support the “wyte” of the Soviet Union or of the United States or they agree to a “compromise” seeing both parties as culprits (the viewpoint of the so-called “revi-

sionist” historians in the USA). Perhaps, additional points to prove either of the conclusions can yield their author some popularity while they yield next to nothing in terms of drawing lessons from the Cold War and the development of the theory of international relations.

It seems we need a change of the analysis paradigm and give up the idea of finding out who was wrong and who was right and, instead, go over to a multi-factor systemic study of the causes of the Cold War. It is necessary to take into account an entire set of interests’ interactions — military, economic, political, subjective, objective, short-term and a few other. Trying to find just one factor that was the cause of the Cold War seems to be not really productive in the scientific sense.

As one can conclude from the presentations that we have heard here, there is no unanimity in approaches and viewpoints on this matter between the participants in this meeting. Some people abide by the old paradigm and are inclined to pay particular attention to the issue of “being guilty”. Other speakers have already focused their attention at various factors that had generated the Cold War, — something that testifies to the fact that this conference is coming to the advanced ground in science.

A number of circumstances that were the causes of the Cold War have been made clear within the framework of our discussion. I am not going to repeat myself and, instead, I shall concentrate attention at the aspects that my colleagues have not been talking about.

Out of their sight were basic provisions of the theory of international relations that testify to the effect that coalitions of weaker countries are set up against any strong power. Let us employ a historical parallel. Let us recall the Vienna Congress after the Napoleonic wars held in 1815. That is not to say that Russia at the time seized too much or made claims that its neighbors could not accept. But, nevertheless, an anti-Russian coalition of all European countries nearly came about at the Vienna Congress. The coalition even included France that had been defeated not so long ago. There was only one reason why: Russia seemed very strong and capable of becoming a threat to others or to their inter-

ests. Napoleon I who, in hope of securing Russia’s support, sent Alexander I a draft agreement aimed against this coalition and only “the Hundred Days” of I Napoleon prevented its conclusion. This did not turn Alexander into Napoleon’s ally but it encouraged Russian diplomats to show more flexibility and prevented the emergence of a coalition of West European and Central European powers aimed against Russia.

What does this example reveal? In my opinion, it reveals the influence that military thinking has on politics. The specificity of the military thinking lies in defining probable enemies. Besides, there is only one criterion applied: the capability to deal a most serious damage in the event of a conflict. Alliance, friendly and neutral relations do not count. It is assumed that yesterday’s ally can always become an enemy when the situation changes. Indeed, in history this has been common occurrence.

Let us employ historical parallels once again. Any re-division of the world, and re-allocation of the spheres of influence has been always accompanied with conflicts and collisions. And, more often than not, former allies turned into enemies. Let us recall the end of the First World War. Italy and Japan supported the Entente but in the years of the Second World War they became enemies of their former allies — France, Great Britain and the United States. The reason was dissatisfaction over the re-allocation of the spheres of influence.

Even when it is officially declared that there are no specific enemies the military top must plan defense in every sector». This is a specialty of the military thinking and, indeed, the role of the armed forces in any country is very high after winning in any war.

Thus, after the Second World War (in fact, even before it ended) the US and British military top started to see the Soviet Union as the chief future source of the likely military threat. According to the first post-war estimates made by the US General Chief of Staff, even the US possession of nuclear weapon did not ensure a victory in the event of a war with the USSR. First, the USSR could defend itself against this weapon because the nuclear carrier vehicles — heavy strategic bombers B-29 — were more vulnerable in the face of the Soviet anti-aircraft defense facilities.

Second, in Euro-Asia and in Africa the Soviet Union enjoyed substantial supremacy in ground troops and, according to these estimates, could seize all countries in Europe as far as the English Channel as well as the whole of Asia, the Middle and Near East and Northern Africa. All this was perceived — and communicated to the Western ruling circles as a totally unacceptable and a very dangerous prospect.

After the USSR developed its own nuclear and then thermonuclear weapons (even in the early 1950s the USSR had its delivery vehicles — the Tupolev bombers — that could theoretically reach the US territory in a one-way flight) the situation as seen by the US military top became even more dangerous. This boosted the arms race.

According to the Soviet military commanders the USA as a country in monopoly possession of the nuclear weapons that had demonstrated its will and determination to use it against the civilian population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was also a threat that could inflict it very grave, if not irreparable damage. The probability that the USSR could inflict any substantial degree of damage on the US territory was minimal before the USSR obtained intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Soviet military top was also mindful of the potential enemy's advanced military and economic potential and its absolute supremacy on sea. The majority of towns and cities in the Soviet coastal regions were vulnerable to the attacks by the US sea-borne aviation.

All this was a very good reason for the military top both in the USSR and the USA to look at each other through the prism of many centuries of mankind's historical experience and see the other party as a most dangerous potential enemy.

I am in no way justifying this logic, but it is part and parcel of a mentality typical of all military men. In the long run, it is their duty to perceive reality under the angle of "threats", including potential and eventual ones, because they are responsible for their countries' security. It is the duty of politicians, while taking stock of the military opinion, to provide a more balanced assessment of the situation and not let the military thinking take their countries too far along the path of confrontation and opposition.

But this was not done during the initial period of the Cold War. Why did this happen?

In the USSR I.V. Stalin did not allow anyone to influence his decisions. There are great many facts that testify he was able to control the professional military top. Among these facts are G.K. Zhukov's falling out of favor, repressions that hit the military top in the late 1940s and a few more. L.I. Brezhnev was unable to oppose the military logic but this dates back to a totally different period in history.

US historiography qualifies H.S. Truman quite as a mediocrity, man of a limited mind, whom — during his time as the US Vice-President — President F.D. Roosevelt would keep out both of "big" diplomacy and of handling military issues. This line of judgment may be right to some extent but one should not conclude on this basis that Truman was inclined to yield to the pressure coming from the military men. The system of decision-making in the US precluded the possibility of a one-dimensional influence exerted by one political force (even at the time of McCarthyism). Besides G.S. Truman proved his resolve and capability to stand his own ground (as is shown, in particular, by the resignation of General McArthur who had insisted on the use of nuclear weapons in Korea).

Consequently, the pressure from the military — although it explicitly affected the policy pursued by both parties — was not the crucial factor in moving toward the Cold War. Resentment between former allies develops into a sustained opposition if there are underlying causes for that.

The nexus between home and foreign policy that was not spoken about today is certainly an axiom, and reference thereto seems trite. But it must not be disregarded in this particular context.

The previously locked and ideologically one-dimensional Soviet system somewhat opened after the war. Very many soviet soldiers went to other countries and could see the way people lived there. So they had enough ground to doubt many theses that the official propaganda promoted. Besides, the people wanted a change for the better after the war and expected a relaxation of the domestic policy. As reflection of this feeling at quite a high level

was the idea of one more New Economic Policy proclaimed by the top managers of the State Planning Committee with the purpose to rehabilitate the economy. But Stalin and his closest entourage were keener on the idea that corresponded their mentality — the idea of development by means of mobilization. Having apprehensions as to the survival prospects of the system of governance and management that they had created they were going out of their way to tighten the screws on the nation and maintain exceedingly strict discipline within the country.

The method worked and, indeed, it helped in building back the damaged economy. But to make the method effective it was necessary to create an image of the foreign enemy, so Western countries and especially the USA were turned into such an enemy.

Speakers before me have said here that the Cold War was not merely an opposition between the USSR and the USA, but it meant fighting between the two systems. It is true that the Soviet Union — for the first time in its history — became the leader in the system of alliances that was going through a very difficult period of its inception right after the war. The Soviet leadership also used the image of the foreign enemy in order to consolidate this system and to strengthen the stand of the communist and workers' parties in power.

Not only the Soviet Union but also the United States developed keen interest in having an image of the foreign enemy.

Let me remind that in his day Roosevelt assumed that the main frictions after the war would be between the USSR and Great Britain while the USA would act as an umpire and, perhaps, help Britain while, on the whole, being a "happy third". This vision of the future conceded that normal relations could be maintained between the Soviet Union and the United States. Incidentally, this explains F.D. Roosevelt's tractability at the Yalta meeting of the three great power leaders. But after the war ended it turned out that Britain had been too weakened to play the part of the main force opposing the USSR in the world arena. Hence, the USA had to assume this role. In this respect the transition to the Cold War, considering the internal economic situation of the USA, was a saving remedy for the US economy.

Already in 1945–1946 there were deterioration symptoms in the US economy caused by a decline in the amount of military orders. In spite of the huge economic potential of the US, its gold reserve, etc., there began a curtailment of production. But it succeeded in avoiding a crisis. A method to overcome it was the adoption of the Marshall Plan that allowed to direct the output surplus produced in the USA to the European countries in the form of aid. Another method of economic recovery was the Cold War. Already in 1948 the declining trend was successfully offset. There began orders to produce strategic bombers. Nuclear industry was developing at fast rates. In other words, US economic incentive in the Cold War was obvious.

There were also interests connected with the system of alliances. Although Americans are pragmatic, they have a skill of thinking in strategic, long-term categories. It was absolutely obvious the America's exceptional position (more than 50% of the world industrial output) could not last forever. The US profited by the weakened position of Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, etc. But Americans could not but understand that the allies and former enemies that joined the US alliances system would soon restore their war ruined economies, and this could open a new round in the struggle to re-divide the world between Western Europe and North America. In order to prevent this from happening and keep in control of its system of alliances or anyway to preclude uncontrolled forms of the struggle for the markets US needed an external enemy. The Soviet Union became this enemy. The Soviet leadership, especially under I.V. Stalin and partly under his successors, in particular under N.S. Khrushchev, as if serving Washington's order, were turning their country into some sort of fright that helped the US achieve its goals.

It was due to the Soviet policy that after Western European countries and Japan had recovered their economic potential the economic war that began between them and the USA took a civilized course — the introduction of agreed export and import quotas, the use of uniform rules of trade, etc. The desire of the US allies to preserve the US "Nuclear umbrella" and keep themselves

safe from the Soviet aggression (no matter whether eventual or real) prevailed over all other interests.

A few years ago an American pacifist stated that the Soviet and US militaries were best friends because while seeking to intimidate their governments with external threats they were getting money to finance the implementation of new military programs that required relevant responses from the potential enemy.

Following this logic, the spiral of the arms race was infinitely moving ahead. In my view the prevalent situation was somewhat different. The Cold War was really controlled by politicians who — both in the USSR and the USA — were gaining from it in several respects. This also explains the situation that the discussion participants spoke about earlier: neither side was trying to initiate or boost the Cold War or assume responsibility for its aggravation, while doing nothing to avoid it. Moreover, one can recall that both at the initial and the follow-up stages of the Cold War both sides were eager to show they were peaceful and launched various peace initiatives. It is quite another matter that these initiatives were formulated as inherently unacceptable to the opponent and gave him a reason to turn the proposal down.

Part II. How the Cold War Ended

Introductory remarks

Anatoly Chernyayev,

Doctor of History, the Gorbachev Foundation

While thinking about the motive, propellants and driving forces of the Cold War I have counted something like twenty points. I am not going to list all of them, but these include everything — ranging from historical inevitability, irrational motive and, to put it simply, a silly doing to amorality in politics. And the emphasis on a particular group of motives will determine the answer to the question: who is to blame or whose fault is greater?

From here follows another, even more important circumstance. Having come to the brink we faced the question: where do we begin the dismantling of these factors, motives, causes, etc. Gorbachev is the chief person in bringing the Cold War to an end and he started with morality. I think this was the most correct and optimal choice if one understands morality in broad terms — ranging from the nuclear war prevention, the removal of ideological confrontation that was absolutely vehement and sowed hatred between people, to taking due regard for the real vital interests of one's own peoples and of the international community as a whole.

There is a variety of assessment and opinion as to the duration time of the Cold War. I have quite a definite judgment, which I uphold in all convenient and inconvenient cases and situations.

Some people say that the Cold War ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Other people think it ended with the signing of the Act on the Reunification of Germany. There is a belief that it ended as a result of cooperation between the United States and the USSR in stopping Saddam Hussein's aggression. There is an opinion the

Cold War was gone after the Soviet Union ceased to exist and after the West defeated communism. There are other points of view as well. The choice of any of those certainly depends on the ideological engagement and on some other reasons or, perhaps, on the lack of knowledge about the real course of events. But science requires clarity in notions while the science of history uses dates.

The Cold War is a definite period in history. The prerequisites of any historical period come about before the period begins while its effects continue after the period is over. And there was a very good reason to call that period a *War*. And there is a very definite way to declare and finish wars.

I believe the Cold War was declared, if not started in Fulton in February 1946 and ended in Malta in the beginning of December 1989 when the leaders of the two superpowers — the main actors involved in the Cold War — stood up from their seats in a small cabin on board cruise ship “*Maxim Gorky*” and shake hands (there were many pictures of this taken mostly by Italian newsmen). And then the leaders say that they no longer see their countries as adversaries. Those of us who attended this (we were few) understood that a new phase was beginning — and not just a phase in diplomatic relation, but in the world development. I think that the follow-up developments confirmed our first impression.

In my articles I am giving a detailed description of what was happening in Malta. I am a little bit surprised that historians and publicists pay an inadequately small attention to the event that took place in Malta. But in the archive there are transcripts of discussions and negotiations that took place there. The new book by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev *The new book by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev «To Understand Perestroika»* (Russian edition, 2006) a lot of attention goes to this event — the Malta Summit — and it is adequately appraised.

Indeed, the ingredients of the Cold War are still there. They have remained even after the Soviet Union was gone. Nevertheless, the period that had contained the gist of confrontationalist features was over, and those features were no longer acting the way they had acted before. This was a point of no return to a process that had lasted 40 years, and this has decisive importance.

How Did the Cold War End?

Andrey Grachev,
Chairman of the World Political Forum’s Scientific Committee

Present in this conference room are many people — first and foremost M.S. Gorbachev — who contributed their energy and political courage to do an unprecedented thing in world history: they brought to an end the most dangerous political conflicts of the past century that threatened Mankind with the third and, probably, the last world war. In this audience it is simply absurd on my part to remind those present the historical sequence of events. My objective, therefore, is to launch and encourage a discussion on questions that the unique epoch either left unanswered or did not make fully clear. The discussion can also address issues, which were added as various versions, if not myths to the description of events that radically changed the world more than 15 years ago.

For doing this I would like to raise several key and, maybe, unexpected questions before the participants in the discussion. Without addressing these issues it is impossible, in my opinion, to answer the question, which the organizers of this conference have put before us. “How did the Cold War end?” As a matter of fact, this question should be worded differently. We all know how the Cold War ended. We still argue about “why it ended”. Let me suggest some of my questions. What was the precise time when the Cold War ended? What did it end in? And, at last, an absolutely unexpected question: “Did it end at all?” Some people may think these questions farfetched or naïve because at first glance answers to these questions seem obvious.

The point is that the events of past years that we have all lived through — although these events are now gone from the sphere of current politics and did not become part of canonical and respectable history — shifted to the sphere of propaganda and, simultaneously, to the sphere of mythology having generated well-established and carefully groomed political myths. Their descrip-

tions and especially their interpretations differ so much that it is high time we asked whether or not we are talking about one and the same thing.

It stands to reason that the former main participants in the Cold War both in the West and in the East can supply different and substantially varied accounts of the results of the Cold War and of the reasons why it ended. I shall try my best to remind you, in a nutshell, of the main schools and versions that are claiming to have explained what happened.

One of them, particularly widespread in the West and especially in the USA, maintains that the end of the Cold War resulted from the West's united and resolute containment policy toward the Soviet Union and communism as a whole, which — except just a few episodes of detente that reflected naïve and short-lived hopes on the part of Western leaders that they could “teach” Soviet leaders the rules of a civilized co-existence — had the form of a permanent and increasing economic, political and military pressure on the USSR, primarily through the ruinous arms race imposed on the Soviet Union. Under this version, the West particularly owes its eventual triumph in this historic confrontation to President Reagan's firm line aimed to crush the “evil empire”. This policy signified a categorical refusal to appease the communist leaders. It intended to give up illusionary detente which had taken the form of a “one-way street” and resumed rivalry with the USSR in the arms race. The threat that this rivalry may shift to outer space was intended as a means to put the Soviet Union on its knees and force its leaders to surrender on Western terms.

Another version that was also worded in the West argues that the West succeeded not because of its irreconcilable stand of massive pressure against the USSR which only helped the Soviet totalitarian regime to maintain the atmosphere of a besieged fortress at home and within the entire zone of Soviet influence but, conversely, because detente imposed on the USSR — in its various forms ranging from Willie Brandt's Eastern Policy to the Helsinki Final Act — became a trap for the Soviet leaders because it made them compete with the West not in the sphere of producing means of mutual extermination where the Soviet system could have been

quite competitive but, instead, in the field inherently alien to this system — political democracy, human rights, personal freedom and adequate conditions for a dignified life. According to the line of reasoning employed by the adepts of this version, this policy has ultimately resulted in the erosion and internal decomposition of the system's monolith and brought about pro-Western ideological and reformist trends within Soviet society. It ended when the intrinsically degraded opponent of the West turned into something similar to a dead nut whose shell was bound to crack.

In spite of the fundamental difference between these two versions they have one point in common: they are unanimous in giving exclusive credit to the West for the failure of the communist project in the USSR, although for the sake of justice one should remind that the Soviet leaders, strange as it might seem, were no worse than their Western competitors when whipping up the arms race or trying to reap political advantages from the potential of international detente. A more accurate statement is that during the decades of the Cold War both sides, while using both methods and seeking inspiration in different ideologies, abided by the same logic and the jointly established rules of the game and pursued one and the same aim: to prevail over the opponent. It is appropriate if I recall an image that Henry Kissinger, a hero of the epoch, used when he compared the behavior of the two superpower leaders with the fighting of two giants who were either blind or blindfolded and waving clubs. The one thing that Kissinger didn't say is that the two giants armed with nuclear clubs were doing these dangerous moves when both of them lived in a house of glass.

In contrast to the Western version of the causes that ended the Cold War is the interpretation given by the authors of Perestroika. I am saying this under the control of its mastermind, its theorist and its architect — M.S. Gorbachev. I think the unquestionable fact that the wind of historical change that eventually brought down Churchill's Iron Curtain, which he had announced to the world in Fulton, was blowing from the East and not from the West, lends particular weight to their opinion. In keeping with this assumption the Cold War, which, in the process of its escalation that practically went out of politicians' control, was accompanied in both camps by hideous arms race, which developed from a historic

rivalry between the two competitors aspiring to rule the world into the main threat to the world, into a global disaster for mankind. Because of this its stopping was bound to become a priority for a truly responsible policy.

This is how the New Political Thinking was born that was later followed by a practical policy which incorporated unique political initiatives, offered unexpected compromises and unilateral steps and even proposed concessions to its partners that had been incredible within the former political logic. At the same time, while making these moves in keeping with the spirit and the principles of the new political philosophy and with common sense, as the authors of the new Soviet policy believed, they thought they were acting under external pressure or were borrowing Western values. Suffice it to recall in this context the discussion on this matter at the Malta Summit which is so eloquently reproduced not only in M.S. Gorbachev's book of reminiscences but also in the reminiscences by Bush and Baker. According to M.S. Gorbachev, at that time the turn toward political democracy and the support of human rights — at least for him and his associates — was not a departure from socialism and socialist values, but, on the contrary, it meant going back to the aims and ideals socialism had proclaimed. The new policy merely abandoned an imperial, if not even imperialist embodiment of socialism.

The crucial turn in the Soviet foreign policy to discard the logic of confrontation and Cold War is defined by its masterminds as a natural component in the overall concept of perestroika. This was a project aimed to democratize Soviet society and set it free from ideological dogmas and repressive bureaucratic regime. The consistent consequence of this in foreign policy was seen as the abandonment both of the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" and of the entire messianic project inherited from the 1917 October Revolution that had aimed to build an alternative world civilization. Philosophy and practice of the New Political Thinking maintained they were a purely domestic product that grew out internal problems. They did admit they owed something to the West having only borrowed from its most enlightened and democratically or social-democratically minded section (Einstein — Russell, Palme, the Club of Rome, etc.) the appeals to give up the absurdity of nuclear

confrontation and become concerned with the universal global problems facing Mankind as a whole.

It stands to reason that now, having the benefit of hindsight and the achieved results — the end of the confrontation between the two super-armed powers and military blocs, the elimination of the threat of a nuclear world conflict, major shifts in the field of nuclear disarmament, the dismantlement of the Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and many other moves, — people who initiated these historic achievements have every ground to feel gratified and duly proud.

But, as we now know, there is pluralism of opinion in the East, too. When here, in Moscow, one cannot but mention one more version of why the Cold War ended. This version is widely spread here and diligently inculcated by certain people. It explains everything that happened by the deliberate or by the naïve defeatist policy adopted by Gorbachev's team, its capitulation to the West, if not a conscious betrayal of the Soviet national interests. Its authors, including those who themselves, I am sure, have no faith in this explanation are actively using it in order to retrospectively avenge themselves on Gorbachev either on personal or political grounds or to gain a score in the new political games while trying to cash in on the nostalgia about the once great power so widely spread in our society. It is noteworthy that they are either unaware or are deliberately shutting their eyes to the fact that their version virtually coincides with the most laudatory Western concept that presents the end of the Cold War as the West's law-governed triumph over the East that has thrown itself upon the mercy of its conqueror. The only difference is that the USA and their NATO allies are talking about their victory over the Soviet empire and the communist regime, while in Moscow they are lamenting on Russia's historic defeat. "Hitting Russia while aiming at communism".

Meanwhile those who identify Russia's fate with the destiny of the obsolescent totalitarian regime, those who think that a national tragedy befell Russia when more than a dozen of national states appeared, those who are proclaiming the collapse of the empire that proved incapable of reforming itself to be the greatest disaster

the last century and, incidentally, forget about the tragedies of the two World Wars and the Holocaust are, in the first place, dooming themselves to a political defeat. They prefer pining for the past instead of taking pride in that Russian/Soviet society — unlike Germany or Japan — was strong enough to discover its own, intrinsic democratic forces that allowed it to set itself free of the totalitarian regime and achieve this by their own effort and not as a result of external interference. They bear a by far greater responsibility than the arrogant West for having inculcated in the social consciousness a dangerous complex of an ill-fated and defeated nation.

Such a wide dispersal of opinion between the West and East, or, to be more exact, between Russia and the West, in assessing the results of the Cold War and the causes of its termination is logically moving from the level of historians and analysts to practical policy and lays the groundwork for ambiguity, prejudice and a potential new tension in relations between the states who had only recently buried the hatchet of the Cold War and promised an epoch of a cordial Entente to the world and to their own peoples. One should do them justice and remind that the case in point on both sides are the politicians of a new generation who, luckily, are different from their predecessors because they have not been growing up in fear of a nuclear apocalypse. Neither have they covered the difficult path from confrontation to cooperation and confidence. This seems to have been due to the “phony character” of the real Cold War. After it ended there was not another Yalta Conference or Potsdam Conference and, in particular, no Nuremberg or Tokyo tribunals to have officially stated who had won the war and to have punished the defeated side. Each side got the right to interpret what had happened. The USA as the self-proclaimed sole winner and some of its allies treated the rest of the world as their mandated territory. Russia, listed as a loser, started looking for solace in hopes of taking historical revenge.

This may be the reason why our present international relations, whenever they become complicated, so easily go back to believing that most complex political problems can be resolved through force. The arms race is flaring up, military budgets are growing and the military-industrial complex is rising fast. In order to

solve both external and purely domestic problems and to facilitate their own societies’ and public opinion’s “manageability” politicians both in the East and in the West do not stake at appealing to nationalism which, to be sure, they are calling patriotism. They emulate in finding new enemies and are tolerant to the revival of the spirit of confrontation. Unfortunately, there is nothing new in this. Certainly, it does not have the slightest hint of a new political thinking. These politicians are simply re-discovering the truth that is old as the hills and was contained in Machiavelli’s points of advice or the Concise Course of the Soviet Communist Party History: the atmosphere of a confrontation maintained in society, the presence of an enemy’s image that needn’t even be explicitly defined — in fact, the Cold War was doing this — is more instrumental in home affairs rather than in foreign policy. It allows to consolidate governance and the ruling regime and, of course, the popularity of its leader. And when we hear a Bolshevik cliché? “He who is not with us is against us” coming from an American President this makes us realize that the replacement of ideological dogmas with theological ones does not prevent people from thinking in categories of a black-and-white or a one-dimensional world. Going downhill in this way nowadays mostly results in a very lukewarm peace, if not a new Cold War.

As it happened, having applauded the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rising Iron Curtain the East and the West light-heartedly decided it would never come down again. However, if we are to bury the Cold War for good, we must draw lessons from it. To begin with, it would be quite good if we at least could reach agreement in relation to the time when it really ended. The former participants in the Cold War differ even on this point. Some see the symbol of its stopping in the statement that Reagan made in the Red Square in the summer of 1988 that he no longer viewed the USSR as “an evil empire”. Others think the historic gain came in November and December 1989 — the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet-US Summit in Malta at which Gorbachev and Bush-senior declared they no longer saw themselves and their countries as adversaries. The former US Secretary of State Baker who preferred doing to talking believed the end of the Cold War came in the fall of 1990 when the USA and the USSR voted together in the UN Security

Council in favor of using sanctions, including military force, against Saddam Hussein after his invasion in Kuwait. Indeed, this was the first time in the entire history of the UN existence when its Security Council stopped being a hostage of the Soviet-US confrontation and acted according to the provision enshrined in its Charter as an instrument in the hands of the whole international community against open and ruff violation of international law. It seemed in those days that the page of the Cold War had been turned over forever and that the newly born partnership between the USA and the USSR was a harbinger of a harmonic New world order. At least one could so interpret the words of President Bush-senior addressed to US Congress on **September 11**, 1990 (what a tragic irony of fate!) when he promised the nation and the world a “New World order based on the rule of law and not on the law of the jungle” (**Time**, **28, January, 1991**).

But there are people who are looking at the end of the Cold War in a wider context that is ideological rather than political. For them the Cold War ended only on December 25, 1991 when M.S. Gorbachev resigned and when the USSR ceased to exist. And gone with it was the political project that this ideological state had embodied as an alternative to the Western version. But if one adopted this stand, then the beginning of the Cold War did not date back to 1946 and not Churchill’ speech in Fulton or Stalin’s speech in the Bolshoi Theater but it dated back to 1917 while its true end becomes possible only in the perspective of implementing the ultimate triumph of Western liberalism declared by Fukuyama and the promised End of History. (I know that besides M.S. Gorbachev in this conference room there are other Russian and foreign participants who disagree with this version and believe that a reformed Soviet Union as a democratic confederation state similar to the present European Union could have become an indispensable pillar of the new world order and save the post-Cold War world many contemporary shocks. I am talking about professor A. Brown and some other participants).

All this variety of political and philosophic opinion on the topic of the end of the Cold War which I decided to remind you about inevitably takes us back to the primary question which I think has not yet been answered in full: indeed, what was the Cold War? A

new edition of the trivial age-long struggle between superpowers over their spheres of influence? A collision between two ideological and civilization projects or two imperialisms? The struggle of democratic Virtue against totalitarian Evil? A nuclear poker when players, while bluffing, were trying to impress the rival and got frightened, while demonizing one another? Or, maybe, it was necessary in its own way, as a stage in history, a school for teaching political elites the rules of behavior and coexistence in hitherto unknown nuclear and global world? Maybe, there was a bit of everything. But unless we sorted everything out, we cannot have a peace of mind and celebrate the anniversary of the end of the Cold War.

As the UNESCO Charter says, wars begin in people’s minds. And there they must end. For me (and, perhaps, for other people too) the end of the Cold War was M.S. Gorbachev’s speech in the UN General Assembly in December 1988. Planned as anti-Fulton, this speech served this function having offered to world politics the renunciation of reliance on force and the threat of force, real disarmament channeling thereby released resources to developing backward regions and continents and a quest of joint responses to the unprecedented challenges of the new century that was yet to come. Unfortunately, at the time not many people heard and heeded this speech. H.-D. Genscher, a man with a perfect pitch in politics, said about Gorbachev’s speech: “His speech was in the spirit of a great German and US philosopher Hans Jonas who was compelled to leave Germany in 1930 because he was a Jew. His book “The Imperative of Responsibility” teaches us that each of us faces personal responsibility that goes beyond our daily round because we are responsible for the future. In those days Gorbachev’s address did not meet with the response it deserved, and the majority of “the ruling circles in the West” did not understand its significance”. Let me add to what Genscher said: not only in the West but also in the East including Gorbachev’s home country. His message did not yet reach those to whom it was addressed, and the chance that Gorbachev gave world politics as a gift was not fully used.

But in December 1988 with his reply to Churchill Gorbachev turned over the Cold War page, and he did this on behalf of a concrete generation of politicians in the East and the West. He was not giving any guarantees that new wars would not come to the minds

of the future generations and that the law of jungle would not oust international law from political practice. And, therefore, my last point: I think that working toward ending the Cold War is a permanent need. Otherwise we run the risk of discovering that this war has not receded into the past but awaits us in the future. Even if it assumes a different name.

The End of the Cold War: the Causes and Effects

Sergey Rogov,

Professor of History, Director, the Institute of US and Canadian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

It is a great honor for me to take part in this extremely important, timely and interesting conference. The problem of the effects of the Cold War is certainly a very important one. We have had the benefit of several viewpoints shared with us. I hold the following opinion.

In my view, ideological factor has been playing a tremendous, if not unique role in Soviet-American relations and in the relations between our country and the West as a whole in the period of the Cold War. This goes not only for the Soviet Union. Let's not forget that the US is also a very ideologized nation. American messianism, a sparkling city over a hill — this has been the basis behind the US policy both during the Cold War period and at present. And today it has driven the United States to Iraq.

The second feature of the Cold War which I find extremely distinctive is the arms race conducted at unprecedented rates in time of peace when our both countries were actually keeping their armed forces and their respective economies mobilized for action. This had never happened in world history.

As a matter of fact, before Gorbachev Soviet-American talks essentially dealt with arms control, with the rules of rivalry, with the way to keep off the brink of the nuclear war. Gorbachev was the first

person to have said that the Cold War must come to an end. Arms control was never aimed at achieving this goal. The decisive sphere in this confrontation was the socio-economic field. It was this sphere that determined the outcome of rivalry between the two systems.

I would like to say a few words about something that we often tend to forget: what was the response in the West to the Soviet challenge? The West changed drastically after 1917 and during the years of the Cold War both due to intrinsic causes and due to the challenge that the Bolshevik Revolution had bid it.

I want to support my point with a few figures. Already in the period intervening between the two World Wars all leading states in the West introduced universal suffrage, though in France and Italy women were granted the right to vote only in 1945 and 1948. At present we tend to forget this as well as the fact that Western democracy in reality is a very "fresh" thing. But it was after 1945, precisely at the height of the Cold War, that the West created a mature social state when it was universally recognized that the main task of the state was the exercise of modern functions in the field of education, healthcare and social security, i.e. the creation of social benefits instead of the traditional, purely military and police functions.

I shall cite some figures. In 1950, at the height of the Cold War, the Western states were spending, in average terms, 10 per cent of their respective GDPs on social purposes and approximately the same amount on military purposes, the ratio being 10:10, while in 1990 the military spendings accounted for 5 per cent of the GDP and social spendings — for 25 per cent. That means the ratio of 5:1 in favor of the modern functions.

Let us now look at the USSR. In 1950 this ratio was 25 per cent of the GDP for social and 15 — for military purposes. We were talking today about the wave of nostalgia about Stalin, and this circumstance may have been one of the reasons why people have kept not only repressions and crimes in their minds, in the historical memory but they also remembered the development of the Soviet Union at high rates in the 1950s and especially during the 1960s. But in 1985 the military spendings of the USSR accounted

for 18 per cent of the GDP and social spendings — for 22 per cent. It was almost 1:1 ratio. When Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party this ratio was worse than in the beginning of the Cold War.

As I have said, during the years of the Cold War the West developed the model of a social state in its three varieties: Scandinavian where social expenditures reach 30 per cent of the GDP, West European as in Germany where social expenditures account for 25 per cent of the GDP and the US in which social expenditures seem to be lower — just 15–20 percent of the GDP — but the US economic system and its federal tax policy are unique because an impressive part of social wealth is created by the private sector because there exist tax and credit benefits. So if one adds up social benefits provided by the state (15 per cent) and by the private sector (8 per cent) the amount will be approximately the same (in Germany, for instance, private sector provides only 2 per cent of social benefits).

The strategic concept of waging the Cold War that the USA employed and the strategy of deterrence (that should not be confused with nuclear intimidation) were aimed to ensure economic attrition of the Soviet Union. It was a long war. Washington is saying now that it is waging a long war against terrorism but Gaddis was the first person to have written that the Soviet — American confrontation was a long war. And, eventually, the US and the West gained by fact that all the advanced countries — Europe and Japan — kept the side of the US while the Soviet Union remained alone.

At the XXIII Congress of the CPSU Brezhnev declared that the Soviet system was capable both of safeguarding the USSR's security and promoting the prosperity of the Soviet people. In other words, the Soviet system could make both guns and butter. Petrodollars seemed to have provided this opportunity. Generally speaking, the great leap forward that we made in the arms race in the late 1960s and early 1970s while catching up with the United States laid the groundwork for the signing of agreements on arms control. But its result was stagnation, and historically perestroika failed to correct this tragic mistake because, in my opinion, the time was too short for that.

As for the consequences of the Cold War, I think that the Cold War ended after the signing of Belovezh Accords when the US Administration received on a silver platter something that neither Bush, nor the CIA could ever dream about. The USSR was gone, and the issue of the winner and loser in the Cold War was settled automatically. The USA got the gift, and during 15 years we have been witnessing the US efforts to consolidate the unipolar world. The US succeeded in achieving something unique.

Usually after a large-scale geopolitical conflict the coalitions of winners collapse and winners turn into rivals. In 1992 the US Administration of Bush-senior said for the first time in its documents that the USA shall not allow an equally strong opponent to come into existence, Japan and Germany also being a case in point (Wolfowitz wrote this document). The USA succeeded in achieving this.

One can also talk about the huge resources of the US economy and about the US military allocations that amount to 50 per cent of the world's entire military spending (something that never happened in world history) and to nearly 70 per cent of the world military R&D cost. This means that the US is waging the arms race with itself because its equally strong opponent does not exist any more. Thanks to the special position of the US dollar in the world financial system — something that both the International Monetary Fund and the European Union are talking about — the USA in the past 15 years has been consuming “additional” 1.5 per cent of the world GDP while paying for that in green paper. So today the European Union, Japan and even Russia have a positive balance of payments and the USA is the only country in the world whose balance of payments is negative.

And what was happening in the USSR? In my opinion, in the 1990s the social state got dismantled in Russia. This process was badly accelerated after the financial default in 1998. In 1998 we were still spending 18 per cent of the GDP through the federal budget on social needs. In 2000 the figure was 10 per cent of the GDP, today it is 11 per cent. If we look at the 2006 budget we shall see something unbelievable. The federal budget spending on the military and police branches was 8 per cent of the GDP, while

spendings on social needs (in spite of the national projects) amounted to 4 per cent of the GDP. This means that 8 per cent were spent on the traditional functions and 4 on modern ones, just as in days of yore. If we look at the consolidated budget, social expenditures are 10 per cent and expenditures on military and police agencies are 9 per cent. This ratio is 1:1. But in the West, in Europe social expenditures grow faster than traditional at the rate of 7:1, 8:1. Even in the US the ratio is 4:1. This shows that we are consolidating the state that dates back to Peter the Great.

In conclusion, one more point about the USA. In my view, it is facing a very difficult situation. Twenty years ago Paul Kennedy predicted that the United States would overtax its resources. This did not happen because the Soviet Union collapsed. But America today is facing an economic situation that cannot last forever. The deficit of the federal budget is 4 per cent of the GDP. Last year the deficit of the balance of payments was \$800 billion. This is more than 7 per cent of the GDP. It looks like the world today is financing Bush's policy. It is difficult to predict how long this will continue. Bush-junior, just like Reagan, was cutting down taxes and increased military expenditure but he raised social spendings too. Under Bush-junior the spendings on education and medicines were higher than under Clinton. US economy, too, cannot cope with making "both guns and butter". This is the reason why the US is overstrained.

Many things will certainly depend on the outcome of the war in Iraq where the US stands a big chance of sustaining an overwhelming defeat. Can the USA draw relevant conclusions? Can the rest of the world draw them? After the end of the Cold War a new world order based on international law and common human values so much spoken about in the late 1980s was not created. The USA proved unable to play the part of the world's sole policeman. What will happen next? Chaos?

While looking back at the history of the Cold War we must think of the lessons that we have been taught and, indeed, try to think of a setup in the system of international relations that would neither be based on ideological imperatives nor on the supremacy of strength.

The end of the Cold War: Soviet-American Relations and the Radical Changes in Europe

Marie-Pierre Rey

Professor, Université Paris I— Sorbonne

The end of the Cold War took place through a gradual process and through chronological stages which were significant for different reasons. In this paper I chose to focus on two major steps, — the decisive improvement of Soviet-American Relations on the one hand, and the radical changes in Europe on the other hand.

Indeed, the first significant stage that precluded the end of the Cold War was the settlement of sensitive strategic issues, provided by the signing of the Washington Treaty in December 1987.

I. The improvement of Soviet-American relations and the settlement of strategic issues

The Washington Treaty obviously changed the nature of the relations between the two Super-Powers, leaving behind distrust, suspicion and strategic competition and basing relations on confidence and reciprocal views. It was the result of two convergent dynamics:

The first dynamic took place in Moscow in the two years 1985 and 1986 and it was largely due to Mikhail Gorbachev.

1. The Soviet dynamic

Indeed, Mikhail Gorbachev's personal role has to be stressed. Faced in 1985–1986 with strong economic problems including the cost of the arms race, the new Soviet leadership was for the first time in the history of the country, psychologically and politically not only able to admit the reality of these problems without trying to escape them by resorting to propagandistic schemas, but also able to look for a global solution to them and to call for a completely new

approach to international relations¹. These new aspirations were expressed in February 1986, during the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, when, with the help of Eduard Shevardnadze, former head of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic who had been appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in Summer 1985, as well as of Aleksandr Yakovlev, former ambassador in Canada, and Anatoly Chernyaev, his closest assistant for diplomatic matters, Mikhail Gorbachev promoted the 'New Thinking'.

The new approach to international relations was based on a few key ideas: the fear of nuclear danger shared by all peoples, the interdependence of the problems faced by humanity, the 'de-ideologization'² of international relations and the end of the class struggle principle in foreign policy. From these general principles, three practical ideas emerged: peaceful coexistence had to be cooperative,³ true security had to be mutual, and the USSR and the USA had to promote the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" in their strategic thinking.

These principles denoted a drastic change in Soviet perceptions. The USSR did not see itself any longer as a fortress in danger, it did not dream any more of imperial power and of expansionism in the Third World; rather, it favoured internal development⁴ and

¹ From the Soviet point of view, the impoverishment and the deterioration of the Soviet economy that had resulted from the arms race constituted the driving force underlying the New Thinking: the statements of the main Soviet actors of the Perestroika, collected in the oral archives of the Hoover Institution and of the Gorbachev Foundation, emphasise on the whole the decisive weight of economic questions in the reform of Soviet Foreign Policy. See in particular Anatoly Adamishin's testimony in an interview given on 5 August 199, as well as the one given by Valentin Aleksandrov on 12 November 1998.

² The expression would also be used by E. Shevardnadze in his paper published in *Pravda*, 28 September 1988.

³ Mikhail Gorbachev declared in his report that 'the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems is not simply the absence of war. It is an international order under which good-neighbourliness and cooperation, not military power, would dominate, and broad exchanges of scientific and technical achievements and cultural values to benefit all peoples would take place.' Quoted in Nicolai N. Petro and Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy, From Empire to Nation-State*, (New York: Longman, 1997), p.300.

⁴ In February 1987, at the international peace forum in Moscow, Mikhail Gorbachev emphasised 'our international policy is determined more than ever before by our domestic policy, by our interest in concentrating on creative work for the perfection of our country. For that reason we need a more stable peace, predictability, and a constructive direction of international relations.' *Izvestiya*, 17 February 1987.

promoted disarmament and appeasement towards the West. This policy, more rational than the previous aggressive one, would allow the Soviet Union to devote to civil use resources previously absorbed by military development.

Of course, many of the critiques implicitly or explicitly addressed by Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign policy during the Twenty-Seventh Congress were not completely new. During the 1970s, a readiness to re-examine the USSR's basic foreign policy assumptions could already be found within the Party and in the MID apparatus, in particular from the *mezhdunarodniki*, international relations experts who, for the most part, had graduated from the MGIMO in 1955–60, at the beginning of de-Stalinization and the Khrushchev era⁵. After the Prague Spring and even more at the beginning of the 1970s, these *mezhdunarodniki* had begun to question several of the myths that the Cold War had generated about the aggressiveness of the Western world and its desire to destroy the Soviet regime⁶; they had also started to express their views in specialised reviews such as *Voprosy Istorii* or *MEiMO*, the journal published by IMEMO. Recalling this period, Anatoly Chernyaev stresses the political and intellectual excitement that reigned in the consulting group of the CC International Department: 'We expressed doubts about everything and Ponomarev knew it. This it is not by chance that he called us the revisionists. But he tolerated us because he needed competent people.'⁷

But, and this is why Gorbachev played personally a crucial role, the New Thinking of February 1986 brought consistency and

⁵ On the generational question and the impact of MGIMO on the formation of the *mezhdunarodniki*, see my article "The 'Mejdunarokdniki' in the 1960s and first half of the 1970s: Backgrounds, Connections and Agenda of Soviet International Elites". Editing on process.

⁶ See Neil Malcom, "New Thinking and After: Debate in Moscow about Europe", p.153, in Neil Malcom (ed.), *Russia and Europe: an End to Confrontation?* (London: Pinter, 1994). The author writes about the *mezhdunarodniki*: 'While much of their work represented routine elaboration of official doctrine, the more independent-minded among them were able to smuggle in new ideas from the West behind the obligatory ideological smokescreen. During the thirty years before 1985 the traditional image of a hostile and crumbling West, from which the Soviet Union could and should remain aloof, had been gradually eroded.'

⁷ Anatoly Chernyaev's interview, 24 May 2001, in Collection of oral archives on Perestroika.

visibility to what had been until then a disparate set of partial insights shared by a handful of inside experts and it offered to difficulties an ambitious and global response which, for the first time, was not based on ideological dogma.

The second dynamic took place in Washington.

2. *The U.S. dynamic*

In order to lead to concrete and positive results, the New Thinking had to be clearly understood and supported by the US administration and this process was not an easy one⁸. Describing the Geneva meeting in 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, according to Chernyaev's memoirs, complained that Reagan was "so loaded with stereotypes that it was difficult for him to accept reason."⁹ And indeed hostile stereotypes were strong on both sides. However the next months brought sensible improvements through personal contacts: the Reykjavik summit in October 1986 was a key moment in the Soviet-American dialogue which despite its short term failure, led to the emergence of mutual positive perceptions.¹⁰

Western European leaders like Margaret Thatcher and François Mitterrand played also a major role in inducing the U.S. Administration to trust the Soviet leadership. For example, whereas Chancellor Kohl was still very reluctant towards Gorbachev, French President François Mitterrand on the contrary, in his letter of October 12, 1985 to President Reagan, after Gorbachev's departure from France to Moscow, underlined Gorbachev's character and appeared quite optimistic on the future East-West relations¹¹. Last, the importance of George Shultz's trip to Moscow in April 1987 followed by a new meeting on 23 October 1987 has to

⁸ Cf Anatoly Chernyaev, *My six years with Gorbachev*, (University Park : The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), who wrote on 5 May, 1985, p.32, that «things haven't begun well in foreign policy».

⁹ Anatoly Chernyaev, *My six years with Gorbachev*, p. 53.

¹⁰ Anatoly Chernyaev, *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, p. 85: "I believe that it was the, at that very moment, that he became convinced that it would "work out" between him and Reagan. That the U.S. president [...] had intuitively felt the "challenge of the times". A spark of understanding was born between them."

¹¹ President Mitterrand to President Reagan, 12 October 1985, Archives of the French Presidency, (APRF) advisers' files, USSR, correspondence France-United States.

be stressed: it constituted, indeed, a turning point in the beginning of disarmament.

In all these cases, the "human factor", as emphasised by Gorbachev himself¹², played an important role, leading first to the signing of the Washington treaty in December 1987, and later to the Malta summit in December 1988 and subsequently to the Washington summit in May-June 1990.

Contributing to the end of military tensions and competition, the Soviet-American dialogue was certainly a major stage on the road to the end of the Cold War. However, it contributed more to getting rid of mutual misunderstandings than to asserting shared political and philosophical values. On the contrary, the process which took place on the European stage was probably more decisive on the way to the ending of the Cold War because it had a more global impact, including ideological and even philosophical matters that transcended the superpowers.

II. **The European stage**

In the European process, a major step took place on 7 December 1988 when in his address to the 43rd U.N. General Assembly Session, Mikhail Gorbachev focused on 'the principles of a new world order and on the urgent need for a future based on the co-development of all members of the international community' and publicly agreed to renounce the use of force and the threat of force and stressed the principle of freedom of choice.¹³

These assertions were essential for at least two major reasons.

¹² «In Washington, probably for the first time we clearly realized how much the human factor means in international politics. Reagan for us was merely the spokesman of the most conservative part of American capitalism and its military-industrial complex. But it turns out that politicians [...] represent purely human concerns. [...] These people are guided by the most natural human motives and feelings. [...] now we've embraced the purely human factor in international politics. It is also a major component of the new Thinking, which has born fruit." Gorbachev quoted by Anatoly CHERNYAEV in *My Six Years with Gorbachev*, p. 142-143.

¹³ Cf his address: "It is evident, for example, that force and the threat of force can no longer be, and should not be instruments of foreign policy" (...) "Freedom of choice is a universal principle to which there should not be exceptions." Cited in *CWHP Bulletin*, Issue 12/13, Fall/Winter 2001, p.29.

First, because by departing courageously from the so-called “Brezhnevian doctrine”, Mikhail Gorbachev’s declarations helped to free Eastern Europeans from their fears, to question the Stalinist heritage in Eastern Europe that was based on constraint, and so consequently paved the way to the pacific revolutions of Autumn 1989. Second, because by departing from the old approach focusing on the legitimacy of the European division into two blocs, the declaration already expressed a desire to overcome the Cold War in Europe and to work for the construction of a new pan-European civilization.

1. A new approach to Europe and pan-Europeanism

Indeed, it is not by chance that in parallel with this major address of December 1988, the concept of A “European Common Home” was at the same time being promoted by the Soviet leadership.

Starting in December 1987 with the signature of the Treaty of Washington and from 1988 on, Mikhail Gorbachev, in several instances, gave his perception of the architecture to build and of the new “civilization” to promote. For example, on 29 March 1988 in a conversation with Alessandro Natta, the General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev clearly described his motivations and objectives:

«Everything which takes place in Western Europe, even questions about its integration, is interesting for us. Above all we think ourselves Europeans. We cannot think of improving the world situation with no participation of Europe which has a great historical experience and a scientific and intellectual potential. Nobody can replace it. (...)

A few words on the European Common Home: in promoting this expression, we start from the idea that among European countries, remain differences, true differences, but that at the same time, we are all Europeans, united by historical, economic and cultural links, by ecology. We linked by a common destiny. The idea of European Common Home transforms the results of the Helsinki Process. The “bricks” for the house will be a disarmament policy based on the principle of equal security, on economic links between countries, in particular between EEC and CAEM, on cul-

tural exchanges, on the solution of ecological problems and so on...»¹⁴

At that time, there was still an opportunistic dimension in Gorbachev’s proposals: for example, since the relations between the USSR and its Eastern satellites became increasingly difficult and their economic exchanges weaken, the Soviet Union had a clear economic incentive to develop trade and exchanges with Western Europe. But Gorbachev’s perception of Europe was becoming more global and more ambitious. In his mind, «the European Common Home» could first contribute to evacuate the bipolarity of the world and bring in this way security to the continent and second, it could provide a framework in which the reformed USSR and its reformed Eastern satellites could grow. This framework would be based on a «socialism with a human face», that is, a socialism that would be tolerant, respectful of others’ values, respectful of the principle of renunciation of force and on the principle of freedom of choice. In 1988, V. Lukin, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official, shared and clearly expressed Gorbachev’s perception, writing in *Moskovskie Novosti*:

«By Europe, we should understand not only the political phenomenon, but also a definite method as to how to live, think, communicate with other people... The «Common European Home» is the home of a civilization of which we have been at the periphery for a long time. The processes that are going on today in our country, and in a number of socialist countries in Eastern Europe, have besides everything else a similar historical dimension — the dimension of a movement towards a return to Europe in the civilized meaning of the term.»¹⁵

The theme of a «return to Europe» is also present in several statements collected in their oral archives by the Gorbachev Foundation and the Hoover Institution. For diplomat Anatoli Adamishin, Gorbachev’s foreign policy towards Europe demon-

¹⁴ Meeting between Gorbachev and General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party Alessandro Natta, 29 March 1988, in Gorbachev Foundation Archives, fond n° 3, (Zagladin fond), document n°7129.

¹⁵ V. Lukin in *Moskovskie Novosti* (Moscow News), 1988, n° 38. Quoted in Neil MALCOM (ed), *Russia and Europe: an end to Confrontation?*, p.14.

strated an aspiration to a return to *Western civilization*¹⁶. Similarly, for Anatoly Chernyaev, the objective was indeed for Russia to «return to Europe»¹⁷.

To my mind, the idea of the European Common Home was one of the most important in these decisive years and probably the most interesting one if we are to understand the end of the Cold War. Indeed, in calling for a pan European integration, based on disarmament measures and mutual security, and in calling for the emergence of a European political and cultural community built upon respect for the Helsinki principles, the idea of a “Common European Home” expressed a profound mental revolution. It reflected a real and deliberate choice to come back to Europe, as well as a utopia that offers a new order for the European continent. This order was supposed to be first a diplomatic one; based on the Helsinki process¹⁸, it could at the same time maintain some of the former links uniting the Eastern European countries and bring the two parts of Europe closer to each other¹⁹, and in the long term help solving the German question. But it would also be a societal order which could be influenced by the social-democratic values.

¹⁶ «He states: «I can only notice that it is precisely at that time that we started to open ourselves to the world in a decisive way in terms of cultural and human links and on the grounds of human rights.» Interview given by Anatoli Adamishin, 5 August 1999. Collection of oral archives on Perestroika.

¹⁷ Interview given by Anatoly Chernyaev, 24 May 2001. Collection of oral archives on Perestroika.

¹⁸ By mid-November 1989, Gorbachev declares to Laurent Fabius, President of the French National Assembly : «We need a Helsinki II, we need to bring the Helsinki process to a much high level, that is, to build the European Common Home. The realistic politicians must frame the question as follows: we should not disrupt the creation of a system of international relations in Europe, but rather develop this system on the basis of new ideas and transform the existing institutions, on the basis of mutual understanding, into true cooperation tools.» Gorbachev to Laurent Fabius, 17 November 1989, in Gorbachev Foundation Archives, fond n°1, opis n°1; extract accessible on the Gorbachev Foundation website, in «conferences», «round table», 26 June 2002.

¹⁹ On 30 November 1989, in a conversation with president Andreotti, Mikhail Gorbachev states: «it is best to bind the two unification processes together so as to lead to a single pan-european process, to build a Common European Home, the objective of which is the new Europe.» Mikhail Gorbachev to President Andreotti, 30 November 1989, in Gorbachev Foundation Archives, fond n°1, opis n°1; extract accessible on the Gorbachev Foundation website, in «conferences», «round table», 26 June 2002.

This last point is important: disappointed by the conservative mind of the communist parties — and even some Western European ones, — in 1988–89 Mikhail Gorbachev started turning towards social-democratic parties and sharing their values, as illustrated by the XXVIIIrd Congress program²⁰. And in September 1991, in his talk with the French Socialist Pierre Mauroy, vice-president of the Socialist International, he emphasized his attachment «to democracy, glasnost, to human rights and freedom, and to the socialist idea»²¹, showing his willingness to see the Soviet regime evolving in its values and identity.²²

However, in the short term, the concept of «European common home» brought disappointments for the Soviet leadership.

2. Some strong disappointments

First, while with respect to the German question, Mikhail Gorbachev expected a gradual and progressive process of reunification, he had to face instead a quick move propelled by Chancellor Kohl and his advisers. For Mikhail Gorbachev, German unification was inevitable in the long term because the division was not natural; but it had to take place only in the very long term, through a progressive convergence between the two blocs. This approach was largely shared by François Mitterrand who, during their meeting in Kiev in December 1989, insisted on the idea that European integration, all-European moves and German unification should not be contradictory but complementary processes²³. But

²⁰ See Mikhail Gorbachev’s paper in the book *The Social-Democracy at the eve of the XXst Century*, p.66.

²¹ Gorbachev to Pierre Mauroy, 17 September 1991, in Gorbachev Foundation Archives, fond n°1, opis n°1; extract accessible on the Gorbachev Foundation website, in «conferences», «round table», 26 June 2002.

²² The necessity to cooperate with the social-democrats is also defended by the Direction of the Italian Communist Party, see Vadim Zagladin’s meeting with Alessandro Natta, 29 March 1988. In Gorbachev Foundation Archives, fond n°3, document n°7125.

²³ F. Mitterrand stated: «It is necessary to make sure that the all-European process develops more rapidly than the German question and that it overtakes the German movement. We have to create all-European structures. The German component must only be one, and by no means the dominant of leading element of politics in Europe.» Meeting between President François Mitterrand and Mikhail Gorbachev in Kiev, 6 December 1989. Gorbachev Foundation Archives, fond n°1.

reality turned out to be different since in February 1990, in his meeting with J. Baker, Mikhail Gorbachev was compelled to recognize the German right to unification, at a time when all-European structures still did not exist.

In the following months, Mikhail Gorbachev tried to avoid the worst-case scenario, the German unification under NATO authority: this is why he first proposed to promote a neutral reunified Germany, and then to promote a reunified Germany which would be part of the two military alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact; in his view, this last solution would respect the general architecture of the European Common Home. In a joint press conference with Mitterrand in Paris on 25 May 1990, Mikhail Gorbachev stated that this solution «may constitute a way to demilitarize these organisations and reinforce instead their political dimensions.»²⁴ He tried also to get a military-political status for Germany in NATO similar to that of France. But he was discouraged to go in this direction by the French president himself. In his meeting with Gorbachev on 25 May 1990²⁵, Mitterrand told the Soviet leader that this solution would never be accepted by the Germans and that now, time had come to accept the full membership of the FRG in NATO. Several months later, at the Soviet-American summit in Washington on June 1990, Gorbachev accepted, de facto, the unified Germany's membership in NATO.

While he expected that the Common Home might lead to a renewed Soviet-Eastern European community through the promotion of "Socialism with a human face", he had to face a complete breakdown of relations between the Soviet Union and its former allies. Indeed, throughout the year 1989, as they started freeing themselves from the hold of the Soviet Union, in conformity with the principle of freedom of choice, the «new» States advocated for a complete break-up with the communist legacy²⁶; hence, by the end of 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev's dream was already largely compromised: Central and Eastern Europe chose to join the rest of the continent and took its place in the «common home» by absorbing a

²⁴ Text of the press conference, 25 May 1990, in La Documentation Française, Paris.

²⁵ Meeting between François Mitterrand and Mikhail Gorbachev, 25 May 1990 in Gorbachev Foundation Archives, fond n°1.

²⁶ In August in Poland, in November in Czechoslovakia.

Western model rather than through the respect of each other's differences. As A. Chernyaev emphasizes:

«Gorbachev thought that bringing freedom to our Eastern satellites would lead them to adopt a socialism with a human face. He made an enormous mistake because these countries brutally turned their back on us.»²⁷

In the spring 1990, Gorbachev's dream totally collapsed when Hungary started expressing its intention to leave the military structure of the Warsaw Pact; Hungary was followed by Czechoslovakia and Poland, which also expressed their interest in NATO and, to a lesser extent, in the Western European Union. So by the spring 1990, the Common Home Project, based on the parallel disappearance of the two military alliances, was obviously ruined by the sudden reinforcement of NATO and the quasi-death of the Warsaw Pact.

Finally, while Gorbachev found in François Mitterrand and in the French project of pan-European confederation an enthusiastic echo of his own orientation, he was consequently obliged to share with the French president both U.S. animosity and the hostility of the former Eastern bloc.

President Mitterrand presented his project of a European Confederation for the first time on 31 December 1989, in a TV speech to the French people. In the light of the uncertainties generated by the Soviet retreat from Europe and the emergence of national feelings throughout Europe, he proposed to unite European states in a new structure. He specified that the confederation would have to be built on the Helsinki agreements, and that it would associate «all the States belonging to our continent in a common and permanent organization of exchanges, peace and security» when the former communist countries would have opted for a «representative system and for freedom of information.»²⁸ Five days after, receiving Chancellor Kohl at Latche, the French President asserted that the USSR, as a European country, would have to be part of the confederation, statement which was of course enthusiastically received in

²⁷ Chernyaev's testimony, 24 May, 2001, in the Collection of oral archives on Perestroika, Hoover Institution and Gorbachev Foundation.

²⁸ François Mitterrand's New Year Declaration, 31 December 1989, in La Documentation Française, Paris.

Moscow²⁹. In the same meeting, Mitterrand mentioned also the motivations which brought him to argue in favour of a new pan-European structure. The French President defined the confederation as a «perspective» for «all the countries which will join Democracy» but could not be able for economic reasons to join for a while the European Economic Community, which could not «grow indefinitely». Hence, for Mitterrand, the confederation would not substitute to the European community -which remained his true priority — but would constitute a concentric circle, larger and less tightened than the EEC. Mitterrand's project differed in that respect from Gorbachev's previous one, which instead presumed the disappearance of both the EEC and COMECON. But the French President's and Gorbachev's projects had in common a pacific design and an attachment for security questions and human rights.

At the beginning of February 1990, Mitterrand specified the structure of the future confederation: he proposed to establish a council of Heads of State or government and common institutions such as a permanent secretary, a representative assembly, a European court of Human Rights and a Charter of minorities coupled with a mediation process for conflict resolution. And he got Kohl's support by the mid of February³⁰.

To defend and promote his project, in January, the French President made a trip to Hungary where he insisted on the new danger represented in Europe by the national minorities issue³¹ and presented the confederation as an antidote to this problem. In March 1990, he went to Poland before receiving Vaclav Havel in Paris (also in March) and the Polish Prime Minister Mazowiecki in May. And on 29 October 1990, he signed a new French-Soviet Treaty³², the first one since 1944, which tended to promote the idea of the Confederation.

²⁹ See for example the telegram from the French Embassy in Moscow, n°72, 8 January 1990, in the Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe 1986-1990, URSS, box n°6649.

³⁰ During their meeting in Paris, 15 February 1990, in APRF, URSS, fonds des collaborateurs.

³¹ Shown by the Yugoslavian crisis.

³² See the text of the treaty signed on 29 October 1990 in Archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe 1986-1990, USSR, box n°6670 and see also Yuri DUBININ's Memoirs on this specific point.

However, the results were quickly disappointing for the French President and for Mikhail Gorbachev: the Prague Conference of June 1991, which was supposed to bring new ideas and proposals, led to a deadlock. Whereas for Mitterrand Europeans might build the Confederation without any interference of the United States, Central and Eastern European leaders, and notably Vaclav Havel, clearly affirmed their preference for NATO structures rather than for a European hypothetical confederation. Moreover, when Mitterrand tried to give life to a pan European political structure, he was suspected by the Eastern European leaders to do his best to prevent their countries from entering the EEC. According to Hubert Védrine³³, as for F. Mitterrand himself, the American administration induced the Eastern European leaders to decline the French proposal and ruin the project, because it could not accept the birth of a European confederation integrating the USSR and not the United States. Finally, at the end of June 1991, the project of the European confederation, the only child of the Gorbachevian concept of European Common Home, was finally abandoned by French diplomacy.

Consequently the concrete results brought about by the concept of A 'European common home' were maybe not as important as Gorbachev had expected. But by getting rid of old ideological Marxist-Leninist schemas claiming that the Soviet model was more valuable than the Western one and by signing the Charter for the New Europe in November 1990 — one which was explicitly based on Western European political and philosophical values, such as the respect for human rights and freedom — the Soviet leadership clearly asserted its wish to "come back to Europe" and to reconcile itself with its own centuries-old European destiny. To my mind, this acceptance of the Paris Charter in November 1990 was the last stage which led to the end of the Cold War and it may have been the most important outcome of the whole process.

³³ See Hubert VEDRINE, in *Les mondes de François Mitterrand, A l'Elysée*, 1981-1995, p.448.

Discussion presentations

Hans-Dietrich Genscher,

Former Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic Germany

I had two completely different personal situations when the Cold War started and when it ended. I spent the first seven years of the Cold War in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany and in the newly established GDR, from where I moved later to the Federal Republic of Germany. In the period of overcoming the Cold War, I was holding various positions in the government and played an increasingly active part in this process.

If we talk about the causes that led to the end of the Cold War, we can say that the situation that prevailed in Europe in the post-war period was the one that could be called “asymmetric stability”. The relations between the two opposing sides during the Cold War were shaped by the human factor, the economic and political factor, which also included the two ideologies, and the military factor.

The course of events in the Soviet sphere of influence demonstrated that the growing rivalry between the two systems had negative consequences for the Soviet Union. There were popular uprisings in Eastern Europe, which it had to suppress: in 1953 in the GDR, repeated uprisings in Poland, and in 1956 in Hungary. The construction of the Wall in Berlin on August 13, 1961 was actually the evidence of recognition on the part of the then Soviet leadership, as well the GDR leadership, that the rivalry between the two systems was unwinnable — at least for the Eastern bloc. People were trying to escape to the West; so, it was necessary to prevent them from doing this.

At the same time, the two sides were equal in terms of military strength. And the reason for that was not the fact that one side had by one thousand missiles or warheads more or by one thousand missiles or warheads less. Both sides had an overkill capacity to wipe out the human race in the event of a nuclear conflict.

At that time a discussion was launched in the West about the ways of overcoming this extremely dangerous situation which emerged in the process of confrontation between the East and the West. The Harmel Report supplied both a political concept and a security policy concept to address this problem: adequate military strength to ensure defense in combination with efforts aimed at promoting cooperation to create a common European security structure. The issue of Germany’s reunification was seen as an indicator that could confirm whether or not this aim could be achieved.

The Federal Republic of Germany was assigned a special place in this concept, because it had great many unresolved problems in its relations with the USSR and other Warsaw Pact member-countries. This is the reason why the then Brandt — Scheel government, in which I held the post of Minister of the Interior, availed itself of the opportunities that opened up when this political process started to conclude bilateral agreements and thereby lay the groundwork at least for a peaceful cohabitation with the Eastern Bloc countries. These agreements included the Moscow Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty, the Treaty with Czechoslovakia and the Treaty on Basic Principles of Relations with the GDR.

This policy removed a host of conflict-prone situations that could have caused extremely grave consequences in the extremely explosive situation that prevailed at the moment in the relations between the East and the West. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was making efforts to perpetuate the existing status quo and used the concept of an all-European security conference to achieve this. The goal of this plan was to cement forever the existing status quo.

I beg to differ from one of the previous participants in the discussion who said that the United States supposedly had the same goal in that period. But the Soviet Union did have this concept and in this concept we saw the opportunity to use cooperation and confidence building to achieve a change in the situation in Europe, to bring down the level of confrontation and, above all, to establish a basis for trust to ensure success of disarmament talks.

At this point one should simply look back at the situation which existed at that time: huge amounts of nuclear weapons were deployed in the German territory and those arsenals contained both long-range weapons and the weapons the destructive capacity of which could be used only in Germany or close to its territory, with all the ensuing consequences.

The process that got started in this way led to the signing in 1975 of the Helsinki Final Act and provided a new impetus to the relations between the East and the West. The most interesting point, however, was that in many European quarters that impetus was badly underestimated. The opponents of this process in the West believed this was rather a gift to the Soviet Union. The then Soviet leaders may have been simply unable to properly evaluate the vast potential of different principles contained in the Helsinki Final Act or the opportunities that opened up for direct human contacts or the new provisions applying to the activities of the mass media and, as became clear later, to foresee all the relevant consequences.

The developments in the Soviet Union made possible the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party. By pursuing his policy, which was, indeed, a new thinking, he opened a way out for the Soviet Union and, later, for Russia from an extremely difficult and increasingly deteriorating situation. Indeed, the military factor had already exhausted its potential, unless, of course, one intended to put in jeopardy the future of the entire human race. This means that disarmament was the only response to the situation which existed at the time. Therefore, the goal that Gorbachev set for himself — disarmament, rather than just arms control seen as determination of the maximum size of the arsenals, — was absolutely right. But he was doing his best to change the reality in the Soviet Union by means of glasnost and Perestroika and thereby set his country free from the fetters that caused the USSR's lagging behind in the competition between the two systems. I believe that in the long-term perspective his policies and everything that he could have achieved in that period by implementing this policy will get a fairer assessment than the one that we see in Russia today.

Therefore, I think that putting an end to the Cold War became possible thanks to the resolute policies of the Soviet Union which were a response to the political concept of the Western alliance, i.e. the Harmel Report.

But what did the success of this course of events consist in? Speakers here quite often referred to “winners” and “losers” in the Cold War. Frankly speaking, I cannot understand where this language comes from. Who was defeated, if the threat of a nuclear conflict between the West and the East was removed for good? I have always thought there were only winners on both sides of the table and historical credit for that goes to Gorbachev. He has the credit for having made this possible, for being able to make President Reagan his U.S. partner in achieving this goal. The agreement on the double zero option for medium-range missiles is a symbol of this historic turn. Mikhail Gorbachev should not be held responsible for the fact that today this process is not being taken further.

So, I think it would be wrong to think in terms of winners and losers when discussing this question.

There is one more thing that Gorbachev recognized, namely the independence of other Warsaw Pact member-countries in the sense that was envisaged in the Helsinki Final Act. A lot of criticism has been expressed in relation to the unification of Germany and the consent to our membership in the Western alliance. In this regard I will permit myself to remind that the 1975 Helsinki Final Act had an explicit provision that every country enjoyed the right to independently decide on its membership in any alliance.

I am convinced that ending the Cold War became possible because a confidence-building policy was started by both sides and because cooperation was seen as our common chance for the future.

If the discussions like the one we are having here today make sense at all, it consists in the fact that we have to answer the question about the conclusions that we can draw for the future, — and not just for Europe but also for the rest of the world. My neighbor on my right spoke about a new world order. And I am really one of

those who see this new world order as an order that can only be based on equality and equal rights. In Europe — and now I am talking about Europe within the boundaries of the European Union which, to be sure, does not embrace the whole of Europe, — we have seen ourselves that the peoples who now comprise this European Union were able to come together after what they had done to each other in the 20th century only because they recognized equality and equal rights of states. This is going to be equally important for the new world order, too. This should be a world order resting on cooperation which is based on equality and equal rights. This is going to be a world order relying on the confidence which is built through our joint efforts.

And the task at hand for us is, above all, to understand that this is going to be a multi-polar world order. And I believe that if we are able to draw conclusions from the process of overcoming the Cold War, from the resolution of the problem that was seen 20 years ago as the toughest one among all problems that existed at the time, the problem that we succeeded in resolving through peaceful means, then we will be able to find correct solutions for the future world, as well. However, this means that we should pay tribute to responsibility and far-sightedness and in that period Mikhail Gorbachev, acting in his own way and in his capacity, demonstrated these qualities. Today we can witness what is happening to the achievements of that time and I think this is a very good reason why we must keep in mind the lessons of the past for the sake of our future.

Lothar de Maizière,
*Co-Chairman of the German Coordination Committee,
the Petersburg Dialogue Forum*

My comment will be less scientific. Rather, these will be subjective reminiscences of an East German. Just like my distinguished previous speaker, Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, I have come here from Germany. But there is one slight difference between us: he was looking at the Berlin Wall from the West, from a country with a functioning democracy, from a state with a high level of prosperity, while I was looking at the Wall from the East,

from a country with a great deficit of democracy, which was in fact a dictatorship, and a very moderate level of well-being.

The Iron Curtain, which we simply called “the Wall”, was tightly sealed and strictly guarded. Barbed wire and guns were not aimed at the West; they were aimed at the East, at the GDR’s own population.

In my capacity of a lawyer I had many occasions to defend in court people whose only crime was their attempt to leave Germany for Germany. Such trials were held behind closed doors, with no public attending them and the West secretly ransoming the convicts after the end of the process. Both the West and the East got accustomed to this status quo and it seemed to us, in East Germany, that neither wanted any serious change, since both sides were unwilling to upset the balance of deterrence. Neither my friends, nor I believed that such a state of things could change within our lifetime.

When I was preparing my comments for this session, I was wondering when my friends and I saw the first signs or symptoms of the end of the Cold War. We know from history that a major prerequisite for ending the Cold War (and Hans-Dietrich Genscher already named it here) was the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. If one reads the text of this Final Act now, 30 years after it was signed, it looks like a list of deficits we experienced at the time. But in 1975, we had a totally different subjective approach to it: it was seen as a further consolidation of the existing status quo. Even during the conferences that followed the Helsinki Summit, first in Madrid and later in Vienna, we had the impression that the West was too slow in making demands on fulfilling the provisions of the Third Basket.

In the early 1980s (here I will cite only things like Pershing and SS-20 missiles and NATO dual track solution), we, from what we saw, had the impression that the situation was rather changing for the worse — toward greater confrontation and tension. In that situation we, East Germany’s churches, being the only opposition force in East Germany, adopted a decision at a meeting of the Synod held in Dresden in 1981 that we had to find our own way in the struggle for peace. Over the next few years, we formulated

three fundamental theses. The first thesis said that in the era of weapons of mass destruction wars no longer could be or should be a means of politics. Second, we had to formulate and embrace as a fundamental conviction conscious rejection of the spirit, logic and practice of deterrence. Deterrence does not lead to greater security. Rather, it creates a threat to security. Third, according to God's Will, there must be no wars and, therefore, conscientious objection to military service should be seen as an explicit commitment to one's religious convictions.

It was the third fundamental thesis, conscientious objection, that led to serious conflicts between us and the state but, at the same time, it gave us a high degree of inner freedom because this was the first time that we dared to place our submission to God and thereby our conscience before state interests, i.e. submission to the state.

It took many years before this message was formulated in its final version. Only in 1987, it was adopted in its final wording at a meeting of the Synod of the Federation of Evangelical Churches in Goerlitz. I had the honor to lead the meeting as a vice chair.

At the time the statements by Mikhail Gorbachev that later became known as "new thinking" helped us a lot in maintaining our influence.

The years of 1987-88 were the period of the system's galloping erosion. The need for changes was almost physically perceptible, but, at the same time, we were helpless against the senile obduracy of the powers that be.

The reason why I am reminding you of the situation which existed in East Germany in the 1970s and 1980s is my belief that the end of the Cold War was largely caused by major geopolitical processes and our discussion today has given ample proof of this. However, if seen in terms of domestic policy issues, it also required a situation in which people not only demanded serious changes but were also ready to take part in their implementation and bear all the hardships that went with it.

Anatoly Adamishin,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Russia

Indeed, things that happen in politics — just like in everyday life — are the things that must happen. Half a century ago, the advent of the Cold War was much more likely than continued cooperation within the framework of the anti-Hitler coalition. And it was not because of Stalin or Truman — they turned out to be of the same batch.

In the early post-war period, socialism got as close as never before to tipping the scales in its favor in the rivalry with capitalism. Such opportunity never emerged either before this period or after it.

Germany and Japan were lying in ruins. Great Britain, France and Italy were seriously weakened. The communist parties in France and Italy were gaining ground. The first waves of liberation from colonialism were emerging. The United States had made big money on the war, but it had to single-handedly confront the powerful movement, which after the successful revolution in China already engulfed a quarter of the world.

The ideas of socialism, with its social justice, planned economy, and its seemingly beneficial role of the state, had serious control over the minds of the masses and, more importantly, of the intellectual elite. Czech scholar Igor Lukes put it this way: Auschwitz looked like the final product of crises in the capitalist Europe. Stalingrad was a symbol of advantages of socialism.

Few people knew what remained behind the scenes. Few people thought about the price that the Soviet people had paid, first and foremost the Russian people, who have not recovered yet from the blows inflicted on them.

The United States used all its power to prevent further erosion of capitalism and consolidate its foundations. The means that it used — blatant nuclear blackmail, the Marshall Plan, the creation of NATO, assistance to colonial powers, etc. — caused vehement reaction of the USSR. Particularly odious for us was its putting emphasis on restoration of West Germany's economic

power and involving it in military-political alliances. The Soviet leaders panicked at the thought that June 22, 1941 may happen once again.

This deep-seated fear affected our subsequent policies, particularly in what concerned the thoughtless piling up of weapons.

Only major reciprocal concessions could have prevented the Cold War. For the United States this meant that it had to agree to unification and neutralization of Germany, which could very well find itself in the Soviet orbit, and over the longer term possibly accept Germany's gradual withdrawal from Western Europe.

The USSR as a minimum had to allow freely elected governments in Eastern European countries. But that was equivalent to losing them or, in other words, losing a security buffer zone, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, surrendering the positions that socialism had already won.

In a certain sense Americans were the first to have started it all. In fact, even before Kennan's notorious "Long Telegram", which is thought to have laid the basis for containing the Soviet Union, Truman came to this conclusion on his own. A proof of it is a memorandum written in his hand and concluded with the statement that "I'm tired [of] babying the Soviets". Already in January 1946, he had a comprehensive program of action against the USSR, the key guideline of which was to keep a tight hand on Russia, lest a new war became inevitable.

When Stalin became convinced that the main goal of the Marshall Plan was to restore and strengthen the capitalist system in Western Europe and separate Eastern Europe from the USSR, he quickly began "Sovietization" in those countries that later on became known as peoples' democracies.

To say the truth, the USSR was compelled to finance them in many areas and keep them under close watch lest they should take off.

The Iron Curtain fell a couple of years later than Churchill declared, but it fell nevertheless.

The Cold War was the brainchild of the United States and the USSR or, if you like, of the USSR and the United States. The responsibility was shared 50/50 or, at least, 60/40, depending on the approach. It is logical, therefore, that the Cold War was also done away with in the context of relations between the USSR and the United States.

While there can be an argument about who instigated this confrontation that lasted thirty years, there is no doubt as to who was the mastermind of its termination: the crucial role was played by the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.

Usually, only positive alternatives to the Cold War are considered, but they might as well have been worse.

The main accomplishment of this forty year-long period is the fact that there was no big war during this time. And the destructive weapons that had been accumulated over this period made a nuclear conflict impossible altogether. Armaments did not determine the outcome of the Cold War, in which its main protagonists did not fire a single shot.

When you get down to it, the Cold War was a form of peaceful co-existence. Not the form that we were trying to introduce along the lines that "We are maintaining relations with you, Mssrs capitalists, and we are getting practical benefits from it, and the fact that in so doing we are trying to weaken you whenever we can is the law of social development, sorry". It was the form that developed in real life on the basis of the balance of forces and changes in it, on the basis of common sense, which necessitated exercising particular caution in the nuclear age.

Its key components were ideological confrontation and geopolitical rivalry.

Archie Brown,
Professor of Politics, Oxford University

First of all, I would like to say that for me it is a great honour to participate in a conference presided over by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. I also very much appreciate the opportunity to contribute to a session chaired by Anatoliy Sergeyevich Chernyaev,

who himself played a very constructive and significant role in the process of ending the Cold War as the wise foreign policy *pomoshchnik* of Mikhail Sergeyevich. Anatoliy Sergeyevich has also made extremely valuable contributions to the study (*izucheniye*) of the ending of the Cold War with his diary-based books and detailed recollections.

Anatoliy Sergeyevich has already raised the question of when the Cold War ended. The Cold War was, of course, an extremely important political phenomenon, but 'Cold War' is also a figure of speech (*rituricheskaya figura*). That means that it is not possible to give a very precise, scientific answer to the question of when it ended. However, to my mind, the very latest reasonable date for its ending would be the unification of Germany (*samaya poslednaya razumnaya data — eto moment vossoedineniya Germanii*). In other words, it ended *not later than* 1990. However, the decisive year in the end of the Cold War seems to me to have been 1989 when the countries of Eastern Europe were allowed to become independent and non-Communist. Although some may disagree, I see the Cold War *beginning* with the imposition of Soviet-type regimes in Eastern Europe at the end of the Second World War. Accordingly, it is logical to see the Cold War *ending* when the people of those countries were able to decide for themselves what kind of political system they wished to live in.

In relation to that last point, it is important to add that, from an ideological point of view, the Cold War ended in 1988. It was in that year that Gorbachev — first of all, in the summer at the Nineteenth Party Conference and again in December when he spoke at the United Nations — stressed the right of the people of every state to choose their own political and economic system. That was an extraordinarily important decision, though its significance was fully understood even in Eastern Europe only in 1989 when Soviet deeds, to the surprise of Western cold warriors, fully corresponded with Gorbachev's words. Soviet troops remained in their barracks and did not interfere in the process which brought Communist rule to an end in Central and Eastern Europe.

Sergei Rogov has already said that the Cold War was very ideologized on *both* sides. That is certainly true. A lot of the rhetoric in

the West — about the 'free world', for example — was highly ideological. In the rhetoric of enthusiastic Western cold warriors that 'free world' embraced some highly unpleasant and authoritarian states (as well, of course, as many democratic ones) who were accorded a place in this pantheon of 'freedom' because of the anti-Communist credentials of their dictatorial leaders. Indeed, the de-ideologization of foreign policy proceeded more quickly in Moscow than in Washington in the second half of the 1980s — as part of a more general process of conceptual revolution that was occurring in Russia, and the Soviet Union as a whole, during the period of Gorbachev's leadership.

The Cold War ended long before Boris Yeltsin played any part in the making of foreign policy and well before the Soviet Union came to an end. While the claim is sometimes made on Yeltsin's behalf that he was responsible for the transformation for the better of relations between Russia and the rest of the world, nothing could be further from the truth.

While not many analysts would be so ignorant of recent history as to imagine that Yeltsin played a significant role in bringing the Cold War to an end, there is more controversy surrounding the part played by Ronald Reagan. It is true that Reagan was a significant political actor in this drama. Obviously, the Cold War could not have ended without the co-operation of the United States and its President. However, there is a strong tendency in contemporary America to exaggerate Reagan's contribution and to draw the wrong lessons from the end of the Cold War — namely, that massive military strength guarantees political results.

An example of an interpretation that is misleading in many respects is a recently published new history of the Cold War by a prominent American scholar who has spent many years studying the subject, John Gaddis, a professor of history at Yale University.* Gaddis's book has been extravagantly praised but it is better on the origins and middle years of the Cold War than on its ending. Gaddis argues that if the assassination attempt on President Ronald Reagan in 1981 had succeeded in killing him, the Cold War would

* John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (The Penguin Press, New York, 2005).

not have ended because ‘there would probably not have been an American challenge to the Cold War status quo’.

This gets the impetus for change the wrong way round. It was Mikhail Gorbachev who came to power determined to end the Cold War. Many aspects of Reagan’s policies — from the ‘evil empire’ rhetoric to his fixation with the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) — made that task difficult for Gorbachev. In the end, the fact that Reagan believed in the possibility of change in the Soviet Union, the fact that he shared with Gorbachev a horror of nuclear weapons, and the fact that he had sufficiently strong anti-Communist credentials to protect his rear in Washington, turned out to be assets for the new Soviet leadership. The Gorbachev-Reagan partnership became a constructive and fruitful one.

However, *any* American President who possessed common sense should, with Gorbachev as a partner, have been able to preside over the end of the Cold War. Jimmy Carter can count himself unlucky that his presidency coincided with the last years of Soviet foreign and defence policy run by Brezhnev, Gromyko and Ustinov. Admittedly, President Carter would have been given a far harder time in the United States if he had publicly acknowledged that perestroika was producing fundamental change in both Soviet domestic and foreign policy and if he had, like Reagan, come to Moscow in the summer of 1988 and declared that the Soviet Union was no longer an ‘evil empire’ — that was ‘another era’.

President Bush the elder might have been slower than Reagan to take advantage of the opportunity of a radical breakthrough in relations with the Soviet Union. His initial excessive caution after he succeeded Reagan as President suggests that would have been the case. Nevertheless, Bush in due course established relations of trust with Gorbachev and, together, he and Gorbachev completed the task of ending the Cold War.

It was change in Moscow, however — not in Washington — that was decisive. While Ronald Reagan was in the Washington White House, four different General Secretaries occupied the Kremlin. Between 1980 and 1985 the Cold War was becoming colder. It was only with the arrival of the last of these General

Secretaries, Gorbachev, that East-West relations were transformed.

Western scholars, and especially historians of the Cold War, need to pay more attention to the domestic context of Soviet foreign policy, to the crucial role of Gorbachev, and to the conceptual revolution that occurred in Russia in the second half of the 1980s. Different values and different ideas from those which had been dominant hitherto underpinned fundamentally new Soviet behaviour. Taken together, these factors were decisive in bringing about the end of the Cold War.

William Taubman

Professor of Political Science, Amherst College, USA

Our theme at this conference is how the cold war began and how it ended. But the subject of the current shape of international relations is also before us. The task I have set for myself is to compare crucial episodes from three periods, the first episode from the middle of the cold war, the second from the several years ago, and the third from the time when the cold war was ending.

One might well expect that the most dangerous of these episodes occurred when the cold war was on, and that the most hopeful and encouraging of them happened after it was over. In fact, however, of the three cases I want to discuss, the one that holds the positive lessons for us is the episode that took place when the cold war was ending.

The “hero” of my first case, which took place in the second half of the 1950s, was Nikita Khrushchev. During that period his policy toward the West, at least the military dimension of it, was conducted from a position not of strength, but of weakness. The most glaring weakness was the almost complete absence in the Soviet rocket arsenal of intercontinental missiles capable of striking the United States. Khrushchev’s reaction to this weakness was to pretend that it didn’t exist, to boast, on the contrary, that his missile factories were turning out rockets like “sausages.” For a while at least, the Americans fell for his bluff and bluster. Reacting to what they thought was a “missile gap” in Moscow’s favor, they launched an all-out, strategic nuclear arms buildup, which, in turn,

put the fear of American ICBM's into Nikita Sergeevich. That was one reason, although far from the only reason, why he took the mammoth risk of secretly sending medium and intermediate-range missiles, of which he had plenty, to Cuba. The result, of course, was the Cuban missile crisis (what in Russia is called the Caribbean crisis), posing the risk of a nuclear war.

The second, post-cold war, case I have in mind involved Saddam Hussein. In the first years of the 21st century, he, like, Khrushchev fifty years before, was acting from a position of weakness. We now know that at that time he had no "weapons of mass destruction," neither nuclear weapons nor chemical or biological weapons. But for some reason, probably so as not to show how militarily weak he was, he refused to cooperate fully with international inspections that could have confirmed the absence of such weapons. The American reaction to Saddam Hussein's bluff was, as we know, to invade Iraq in the spring of 2003, beginning the war whose horrors continue to this day.

The third episode I would like to cite occurred in the late 1980s, during the period of perestroika and the new foreign policy thinking in the USSR. Then, too, the Soviet Union's position was weak. Although for a time it seemed as if perestroika was revivifying the Soviet system at home, while attracting millions of admirers abroad, the Soviet economy badly deteriorated, even as the Gorbachev leadership tried to cut back on military spending that had so long drained so many resources from civilian economy. In this instance, however, unlike Khrushchev and Saddam Hussein, Mikhail Gorbachev for the most part didn't bluster and he certainly didn't bluff. Instead, having ceased to view East-West relations as the class struggle projected onto the international arena, and having come to believe in the possibility of global cooperation in service of widely shared values, he launched the process of negotiations which, with the help of leaders of the United States, Britain, France and Germany, led to the end of the cold war, an outcome from which all countries benefited.

What the comparison of these three cases shows is that the kind of dangerous episodes which made the cold war so potentially explosive are all too likely to arise again in the post-cold war era.

The other lesson is that avoid such crises requires taking seriously the lesson provided by the enlightened model of Gorbachev and his colleagues as they helped to bring the cold war to an end.

Svetlana Savranskaya,
Doctor of History, U.S. National Security Archive,
Washington, D.C.

In my opinion, the Cold War ended a long time before the Soviet Union collapsed. Its end came in the autumn of 1989 on the crest of the peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe. But, of course, the symbolic gesture of ending the Cold War was made at the Malta Summit. So, even if the Soviet Union continued to exist, the international system would have never been the system of the Cold War. Why did it end?

Over the past few years, the U.S. National Security Archive has held several conferences in America and in Eastern Europe on the topic of the Cold War. Participants in the conferences came to the conclusion that one of the main, — if not the key, — factors in ending the Cold War was the new vision of the world that came from Mikhail Gorbachev and his closest associates. This new vision proved to be particularly important for Eastern European countries. I shall dwell exclusively on the major elements of the new vision of the world or new thinking, to which participants in the conferences both from the United States and particularly from Eastern Europe have been referring.

The first point is an absolute rejection of the use of force or the threat of its use as an instrument of foreign policy. Ending the Cold War was out of the question until everyone believed that the Soviet Union would really abide by this principle. The second point is the freedom of choice applied as a universal principle. Gorbachev proclaimed both principles in his speech at the UN on December 7, 1988. (In January 1989, U.S. National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft said: "I think the Cold War is not over yet". But, obviously, he did not listen carefully to what Gorbachev was saying at the UN).

The third principle was the removal of ideological considerations from the sphere of relations between states.

The fourth principle was the supremacy of common human values and the idea of a common European Home.

In June 2005, a conference was held in Prague, themed “The Helsinki Process and the Demise of Communism”. It brought together former dissidents from all countries of Eastern Europe. They were saying that after 1975 a network of human rights movements ready for reform emerged, first in Russia and in the USSR and later in all countries of Eastern Europe. However, when asked the question of why the reforms did not begin at that time, many speakers replied that meaningful reforms could not have happened before the late 1980s. The reason was the events of 1956 and 1968 that were still fresh in their memories. It was not until the late 1980s, not until 1989, when they believed Gorbachev and fear was gone, that serious reforms were launched in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War became a reality.

Part III. The Cold War and the Contemporary World

Lessons of the Cold War for the Modern World

Josef Nye,

Professor of Political Science, Former Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University

I am pleased to be here in Moscow. I am meeting old friends and getting acquainted with new ones. I welcome this opportunity to speak in the presence of Michael Gorbachov. I was asked to speak about lessons of the cold war for the modern world. I will dwell on six main lessons.

The most remarkable aspect of the cold war is the fact that it did not turn into a «hot war». Looking back at the twentieth century, one can see that there was a lot of blood in the first half of the twentieth century and a huge number of human victims. And the fact that the cold war did not turn into a «hot war» is remarkable by itself. For this reason, it is important to learn these lessons.

Of course, while the modern world is learning lessons, we must understand that there are substantial differences. There are two types of threats to peace in the current world. The first type is traditional competition between countries. For example, one may ask the question, «Can the growth of China cause conflicts and destabilization of the world balance?»

There is yet another type of threat, it is the new agenda, which originated as a result of information revolution and globalization. I mean the transnational threat of terrorism, which represents a new phenomenon. It is not the terrorism that is new, it is the ability of terrorists to expand their activity over 50–60 countries, the way Al Qaeda does. And terrorists’ ability to cause millions of humans to fall victim to their activity is new. This may be called privatization of

war. Al Qaeda killed more people on September 11, 2000, than the government of Japan did during their sudden attack of Pearl Harbor in 1941.

Having made this introduction, I would like to speak about the six lessons, which I see. The first lesson is that a violent conflict is never inevitable. Probability may increase and decrease with time, yet a violent conflict is not inevitable.

Perhaps the cold war was inevitable. Considering bipolarity at the end of World War II, there was a probability of some conflicts. This was spoken about this morning. But there was no need for anything as deep as the cold war became. This was also spoken about this morning.

With this I approach the issue of perception and fear. For example, when President Truman saw document 68 of the National Security Council he did not allocate all funds for appropriate actions. But after the attack on Korea, he assigned large resources to implement provisions of this document. This means that perception and fear was very important. It is important to regulate fear and apprehension.

Therefore the lesson for today is this: when we see growth of China, we should not base our judgment on fear alone. We must think about ways to regulate relations with that country.

The second lesson: it is very important to understand the role of individual leaders and the way they settle conflicts. It is impossible to understand the causes of the cold war without knowing the persons of Stalin and Truman. This has been spoken about today. And the end of the cold war can not be understood without understanding the persons of Gorbachov and Reagan.

I believe that two people have played an exceptionally important role if we speak about why the cold war did not turn into a «hot war» — John Kennedy and Michael Gorbachov. I would call these two people heroes of the cold war.

In 1962, many of Kennedy's advisors were ready to take a great risk. Fedor Burlatsky knows well: there were people who were ready to pull the tug-of-war rope in their direction, despite the fact

that the knot-of-war had been tied in it. Fortunately they did not prevail.

And in the last period of the 1980s, I believe the new thinking of Michael Gorbachov played a decisive role in prevention of bloodshed at the end of the cold war. This means that leaders must be taught to control conflicts, manage conflicts, learn lessons of the cold war.

The third lesson I would like to speak about is the limits of military power. Military power is important, of course. Nuclear deterrence has played an important role in preventing actions, when a party might cross the line, and a real war might start. There are two things about military power though, which should be noted. Firstly, nuclear weapons are such horrible weapons, that they are muscle-bound. It is hard to image how they can be used. Therefore it is obvious that nuclear power can be used for deterrence only — not to wage a war.

And secondly, in an age of nationalism, which is increasing due to the information revolution, it is impossible to control an enemy population. The United States lost their war in Vietnam, The Soviet Union — in Afghanistan, even though both countries were nuclear powers.

I believe the lesson we must learn from this is in the fact that the old model of occupation of a country with hostile population does not work. Unfortunately, the United States is learning this lesson in Iraq belatedly.

The fourth lesson is the importance of economic power. In the last part of the twentieth century we have witnessed the third industrial revolution or information revolution. This means that computing and communication have become much cheaper. Their cost has decreased one thousand times from 1970 till 2000. If the cost of an automobile had decreased as abruptly as the cost of communications and computing, you would have been able to buy an automobile for a few hundred rubles. What does that mean? That the world has changed most dramatically. That the planned economy, which Stalin used, and which was successful for the second industrial revolution for construction of metal works, etc.,

totally failed to solve problems of the third revolution, i.e. revolution in the computing and communication area. Only markets can respond flexibly and quickly to such changes.

Therefore, when people say that the problems associated with the end of the Soviet Union were caused by «perestroika», they forget that the game had been lost before Michael Gorbachov came to power, because the old economic system could not adjust to the third industrial revolution.

I saw a figure: in 1985, the Soviet Union had 50 thousand personal computers. At that time, the United States already had 30 million such computers, that is, the USSR lagged by several orders of magnitude. The lesson that has to be learned here is that it is impossible to retain competitiveness in the modern world if you do not engage in innovations, if you do not accept what Schumpeter called creative destruction. This means that one has to abandon something in order to get something else. We hope that what we get is better. However, if you are simply going to retain the past –you will lose. This means that success will depend on innovations, in acceptance of global changes.

The fifth lesson is the significance of soft power or non-material, non-violent components of power. What do I mean when I speak about soft power? It is what we get thanks to attraction rather than coercion. If you want to get something by coercion, well then, violence, whip, attacks — are one thing. A different thing is when you win people to your side — that is soft power. Soft power is associated with the culture, values of people, policy of countries, which must look legitimate to other people.

Speaking about the cold war, one must understand that, in 1945, the Soviet Union had a tremendous amount of that soft power. Communism was attractive for many in Europe. The Soviet Union was attractive because it fought against Hitler and fascism. However the Soviet Union lost much of that soft power in subsequent years.

Paradoxically, as the Soviet hard power was growing, its soft power was decreasing. The invasion of Hungary and Czechoslovakia resulted in the subversion of the Soviet soft power.

On the whole, that contributed to reduction of the power of the Soviet Union.

Traditionally, we used to say that the winner would be the one who had the biggest army — the military would win. Today in the information world, the winner will be the most attractive and credible one. One must have a credible narrative; one must have a story that attracts people.

This brings me back to what I said at the beginning — to the threat of transnational terrorism. Of course, hard power must be used against Bin Laden. Yet at the same time, soft power must be used in order to attract a large number of moderate Muslims, otherwise you would not win. If you do not want Bin Laden to recruit people to his side, you must use your soft power to attract the moderate majority.

And the sixth lesson concerns nuclear weapons. This was spoken about by my friend, Fedor Burlatsky, in his speech. I believe one may assert that one of the reasons why the cold war did not turn into a «hot war» was just the existence of the nuclear weapons. Sometimes I call this the «crystal ball phenomenon». If the tsar, Kaiser, emperor of the Dual Monarchy had had that magic crystal ball in 1918, and would have seen through that their empire would collapse in 1918, then I doubt that they would have started World War I.

Thus the nuclear weapon is that magic crystal that allowed leaders to see the horrible consequences of any possible nuclear war. Therefore the nuclear weapons played a role in prevention of a «hot war». At the same time, it is necessary not to go too far in this generalization. Some analysts, such as Kenneth Waltz in the USA, used to say, that many should have nuclear weapons.

But this requires that rational deterrence will always work. However there is not only rational deterrence in the world — there are accidents as well. If we reviewed the Cuban Crisis, the Caribbean Crisis, we would see how close to a war we had been. Or just think about the problem of nuclear materials, which terrorists may lay hands on. If we thought, for example, about A.Q. Khan in Pakistan, who spread nuclear technologies to several countries,

then we would understand: prevention of nuclear weapon proliferation remains an absolute priority.

Thus the next lesson: an agreement on non-proliferation and a regime of non-proliferation are important today as never before. And today's efforts, participated in by Russia, Europe, China, India, USA, in their cooperation to solve the Iranian problem are extremely important to achieve success.

Those are my six lessons. Namely: one must remember that a violent conflict is not inevitable, that individual leaders' role is important, that capabilities of military force are limited, and that one must be very careful about the role of the nuclear weapons.

Let me say the following in conclusion. Every time we learn lessons from another period of history, we apply them to the next one, that is, there is always a risk of misapplication of a historical analogy. There are new problems and new challenges. Therefore it would be wrong to call today's threat, represented by terrorism, a new cold war. Some people call it the fourth world war. It may be a long struggle, but it will be a totally different war.

To summarize, I would like to say that the history never repeats itself but sometimes it may rhyme.

On the "Positive Heritage" of the Cold War

Aleksey Bogaturov,
Professor of Political Science, the Moscow Institute
of International Relations (MGIMO – University)

There are topics in the history of international relations and in the history of our country that are very difficult to talk about today because one has to keep neutral while discussing them. College students with whom I am dealing today are younger and better than I am because they have more freedom than I have. And anyone who just tells them that white is black is sure to lose their trust.

One has to talk to students. And very often students ask difficult questions. So every year on the day when I go to class to give them a lecture about perestroika I know in advance what they will ask me about. They are always asking one and the same thing: who do you think is better — Gorbachev or Yeltsin?

I have to answer. And the answer I give them is approximately as follows: "Neither of them ever asked my opinion when they did what they did. Therefore their attitude to my rights in the sense of the freedom of my choice is the same. But both of them exercised very serious influence on my life. So in this sense, too, they make no difference to me. But one of them — Gorbachev — gave me freedom while the other — Yeltsin — destroyed the country I lived in. So, see for yourselves. I have no answer to your question". I think that time will give its due to everyone. Time is already giving its due. We simply don't live long enough.

When I mention my students, I mean Russian students. Sometimes I am teaching American students too, but my chief audiences are those for whom I am trying to write, to think. These are Russian students, Russian youths. It is interesting to work with students. It is difficult to work with the Russian students of today. But they must learn to talk but also avoid saying lies so that they could keep in their jobs and earn a living. In the long run, governments come and go while Russia continues in being.

When going back to the topic "The Lessons of the Cold War" I want to say that the Cold War experience has many negative features but it also has a lot that I believe to be very important today.

I think the Cold War left us a positive heritage of specific strategic culture. This strategic culture proceeded from the premise that the nuclear war was inadmissible because it was unwinnable. Then, in the epoch of the Cold War, this seemed universally true.

Now, in our contemporary world, we see this is not true. Inadmissibility of a war is quite a local truth. This truth operated as a maxim exclusively in a limited group of old nuclear powers and their closest allies. Today there are great many countries in the world which do not understand at all why a nuclear war should be

seen as an instrument that cannot provide gains and why it should be inadmissible.

When faced with this approach one feels somewhat nostalgic about the merits of the behavior culture that dates back to the Cold War. More than that: one keeps thinking about practical things. It would be great, indeed, if the Cold War strategic culture were imposed on Southern Asia or exported there. It would be quite nice if India and Pakistan were handling relations between themselves in keeping with the rules other than those which they invented or worked out, the rules that are, strictly speaking, alien to them.

Perhaps, this strategic culture would have been a major gain for quite a number of nuclear threshold countries. But now, more often than not, we see a cultural rejection reaction on their part. It is very strong. One can only dream about the proliferation of the Cold War cultural pattern. This is queer but, nonetheless, this is a fact.

Another “positive feature” of the Cold War is relevant of the level of analytical theory. In my opinion, strategic studies made at the time of the Cold War are still unsurpassed. The theory of deterrence in the form that was developed more by the top-level military people rather than by diplomats and political scientists is a definitely unattainable level of military and political thinking. In its day it resulted in a higher level of military and political thinking not only among analysis but also among political leaders. Sufficiently broad section of the educated elite were involved in the debate on the issue of nuclear stability. This, certainly, affected societies as a whole and raised their general intellectual level including the level of civil studies in the field of international relations and political science.

The experience of negotiations accumulated in the process of resolving the seemingly insoluble contradictions between the systems constitutes the priceless heritage of the Cold War. But, indeed, there was not only the experience — there were mechanisms, there were negotiation systems. When I am telling my students today that in the 1970s and 1980s there existed standing negotiation complexes the students are surprised. They do not see the point because negotiating experience has been devalued,

ruined and lost. It is not in demand. But I think it is very important in the present circumstances. It looks like not only Russia and the United States must participate in the present global negotiations. It is high time the negotiations involved China and many other countries including those that are not taking part in any negotiations on global security matters.

Finally, the last merit of the epoch of confrontation. In the very end of the 1980s the idea of priority of concerted actions crystallized out. At the time we had no notion of things like unilateralism. We did not even know the word. But we knew: if one side took measures to raise the level of its security, it must think about the reaction of its potential rival to this move. And we understood it was better to discuss this matter in advance so as not to provoke the arms race. We had to agree on our moves first and act when this was done.

I think this idea was fully “lost” in the past fifteen years. It is only in the recent years and in connection with the definite steps taken by the Bush-junior Administration that we began criticizing the policy of unilateral actions. But even now we forget to say: Bush-junior is simply taking us back the “Brezhnev and Reagan epoch”, to the early 1980s. After the USSR collapsed we have disregarded the heritage of perestroika, we did not value it anymore. And now we are facing a problem that seems new to us but in reality it is rooted in not so distant past.

Of course, I want to say something unpleasant about the present period. I think that if the Cold War now continues, it continues only in the minds. Because irrespective of the attitude to the leaders of the US and of the Russian Federation it is clear today that both of them are “twin brothers”, the “flesh and blood” of the Cold War in terms of how they viewed force. Their thinking culture is based on force.

One can argue about who was the first to have reached this point. It looks like it was Bush who influenced Putin rather than Putin influencing Bush. I think so. But no matter what, both of them are inclined in favor of the same idea — the idea of force. This also takes us back to the same decades in the past since certain negative features of the old confrontation system have returned to life in

a very strange and unexpected fashion, although there is no opposition between Moscow and Washington now.

Bush and Putin no longer fear a war between their countries but they are yet to learn to fear a war — whether nuclear or non-nuclear — with some third party. This is the reason why they are having such a free hand with force.

One of the colleagues made a remark this afternoon that in a certain sense our world today looks like the world of the late 1940s. I would say not the world of the 1940s but, rather, of 1950s. Today — just like in the 1950s — we have not yet learnt to comply with the new rules. We have not yet formulated these rules for us to follow. We, Russians and Americans, are not afraid of each other. And we do not know yet how third countries, the states that have not been involved in the bi-polar confrontation, feel about all this. We are only trying to discover through trial and error the new prohibitive barriers.

Have a look at our strange culture of peace. Once I was invited to give a lecture at a university department in Moscow entitled “Department of the Culture of Peace”. When I came there and started my lecture I thought: “How very strange. This place is called ‘The Department of the Culture of Peace’ and they are asking only about war. Why so?” And then I thought: “They cannot be blamed. Our culture of peace is a culture of peace by means of war”. Indeed, we know of no other culture. This, too, was inherited from the past. And I don’t know what to do about this.

Maybe it is not bad at all that we have at least this culture of peace — to be more exact, a culture of fearing a nuclear war. It has a deterrence effect on many dangerous people. But still it’s a pity that this culture has next to nothing from the idea of cooperation and harmonization of interests. Just look at the way we are pacifying our neighbors. We do want to make friends with Georgia and, instead, we are threatening it. Does the United States really want to wage a war against the Arab countries? The US also wants to make friends with them. And have a look at what the US is doing in the Middle East. We are still on the way to peace through war.

If one comprehends the chief result of the Cold War along the lines that Professor Nye is urging us to follow, then we should reflect on the “soft power”. Anyway, “soft power” or “flexible governance” is a phenomenon from the sphere of ideas and visions.

But if one talks about ideas, then the most valuable ideas of the epoch of the Cold War are freedom and tolerance. In the second half of the 20th century everybody was championing freedom, which everyone understood in his own way. Everyone was championing his own freedom. And, notwithstanding the seemingly strong ideologization, tolerance was at a very high level. We did not like the United States, or, to put it better, we disliked US imperialism but we tolerated it. The US was criticizing us all the time but, more often than not, it understood when criticism must stop because it could provoke dangerous practical actions or developments. Judging by experience of the 20th century tolerance is no less important an idea than freedom.

After 15 years of reforms in Russia I feel quite critical about democracy. Still, I think democracy is very important. But I am inclined to think that democracy is a notion on a lower level than freedom and tolerance. At any rate, it is obvious to me that in the system of values that kept the world going in the years of the Cold War tolerance and freedom stood equal at the top mark in the value scale. Democracy, peace, war — all these are very important notions but they are the notions of an inferior level.

This may be the reason why President Bush on February 3, 2006 in his annual address to the nation admitted that there existed many ways leading to freedom and that there may be a thing like an Arab model of democracy. This may have been a very pragmatic idea determined by current policy. But it does make sense and, undoubtedly, this idea is parallel to the idea of tolerance, to the key idea of the epoch of the Cold War.

Democracies were peace-loving in the situation of the Cold War. Today, when the Cold War is no more, democracies have grown so strong that they began to yield to temptation to use the advantages of their strength. This lays the background against which the epoch of the Cold War in certain respects looks more attractive than the present state of things.

Did The Cold War Really End?

Stephen Cohen,

Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies, USA

My subject is a paradox: Everyone says — politicians, journalists, and scholars — that the American-Russian Cold War ended 15 or more years ago, but today both the American and Russian press regularly publish reports of what they call “Cold War” policies, behavior, and polemics.

The explanation of this seeming paradox is that the Cold War did not end in 1989–91. Only one of the several chapters in its long history ended, and a new chapter is unfolding today. To understand this reality, we must recall that history.

If “cold war” means serious ideological, political, economic, and even military confrontation, but without shots or bombs, then the American-Russian Cold War began not in the late 1940s, as is usually thought, but during the 16 years following October 1917 when the U.S. government refused to recognize the legitimacy of the new Soviet government.

To answer the question when, or if, it ended, we must remember another historical fact: From the beginning there were always, along with maximalist cold warriors, forces on both sides that wanted to replace some of the conflict in the Cold War with elements of cooperation. Their policy later became known as *détente*. But it is also important to understand that mainstream advocates of *détente* never sought to end the Cold War, only to make it less dangerous, because they too believed it was inherent in the different natures of the American and Soviet Russian systems.

Those two historical policies shaped the different chapters of the twentieth-century Cold War.

The first chapter was limited in scope and mainly rhetorical, but its initial years 16 years of U.S. frigid non-recognition and Soviet revolutionary policies generated ideological factors still at

work today. Later, it also included the first episode of *détente*, which began under President Franklin Roosevelt in 1933, when Washington finally granted diplomatic recognition to the Soviet government. Nonetheless, the struggle between extreme cold warriors and advocates of *détente* continued, publicly and behind the scenes, throughout the 1930s and even after the two countries became wartime allies in 1941.

Chapter 2 of the Cold War, along with a renewed struggle between its hardliners and softliners, began to develop after the battle of Stalingrad, when it became clear that the mutual enemy, Nazi Germany, would be defeated. By the late 1940s, proponents of *détente* both in Washington and Moscow had been crushed and the second chapter of the Cold War was fully under way.

This chapter intensified the ideological conflicts of the first chapter, but it was larger and different in two fundamental ways. American-Soviet conflicts were institutionalized in the division of Europe and soon spread around the world. And this chapter of Cold War included a dangerous arms race, particularly a nuclear arms race.

The second episode of *détente*, initiated by Eisenhower and Khrushchev, began badly in the 1950s and was quickly defeated. A full second chapter of *détente* was thwarted in the 1960s by a series of events — among them, the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy’s assassination, Khrushchev’s overthrow, and Vietnam — and got fully under way only in the 1970s, under Nixon and Brezhnev. In the United States, it featured an exceptionally intense public struggle between maximalist cold warriors and detentists, who were largely defeated by the late 1970s. (Having participated on the side of *détente*, I remember it well.)

The third (and potentially last) chapter of the Cold War unfolded in the second half of the 1980s. The drama of this chapter was the historic opportunity, represented by the new Soviet leader Gorbachev, to end the Cold War altogether. Though not well understood at the time, or perhaps even now, Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” in foreign policy was not a program for another *détente* but for actually abolishing the Cold War. (The basic tenets of the «New Thinking» rejected each of the ideological, political, and mil-

itary axioms that had sustained the Cold War on both sides since 1917.)

Thus began a fateful struggle in Washington (and Moscow) between policymakers who wanted to embrace the historic opportunity presented by Gorbachev, or what he called an «alternative,» and those who did not. All of us know this history.

To his credit (and the dismay of many of his right-wing supporters), President Reagan decided to meet Gorbachev at least part of the way toward abolishing the Cold War. After a “long pause,” so did his successor, the first President Bush. As a result, in December 1989, at a summit meeting at Malta, Gorbachev and Bush declared that the Cold War was over. But declarations alone could not end 70 years of conflict and confrontation. Their statements really meant that each would now try to terminate the Cold War.

We do not know what would have happened if Gorbachev and/or Bush had remained in office in the 1990s, but there was already a bad omen. Even when Bush agreed to end the Cold War in 1989–91, many of his top advisers, like many leading members of the American political elite and media, did not believe in or accept this goal. (I witnessed that reality personally, on the eve of Malta, at Camp David where I was invited to debate the issue with the irreconcilable cold warrior Richard Pipes in front of President Bush and his entire foreign policy team. President Bush agreed with me, while a number of his high-level associates clearly did not.)

The proof is that when the Soviet Union ended in December 1991, the U.S. government and media immediately began to present the presumed “end of the Cold War” not as a mutual Soviet-American decision, which it certainly was, but as a great victory for America and defeat for Russia.

That (now conventional) American triumphalist narrative is one major reason why Chapter 4 of the Cold war has been unfolding for more than a decade. It began in the early and mid-1990s — not a decade later as a result of Putin’s policies, as is now alleged in the United States — when the Clinton Administration

made two ramifying decisions. One was to treat post-Communist Russia as a defeated nation that had to model itself on the American system in order to be a friend and junior partner of the United States. The other was to break the Bush Administration’s promise to Soviet Russia in 1990–91 that NATO would not be expanded, in the words of then Secretary of State James Baker, «one inch to the east.»

Fifteen years later, we are witnessing growing manifestations of this fourth chapter of the Cold War, even recapitulations of Chapter 2, primarily, I regret to say, on the part of the U.S. government. (The Kremlin’s contribution thus far has been largely reactive.) Here are four obvious examples:

1. The establishing of American and NATO military power ever closer to Russia’s borders, creating a cordon sanitaire, or reverse iron curtain, and again militarizing relations between the two countries.
2. The tacit U.S. denial that Russia has any legitimate national interests outside its own territory, even in neighboring, ethnically akin countries, or even legitimate full sovereignty in its own internal political and economic affairs.
3. The familiar double standards that condemn Moscow for the same policies pursued by Washington — such as seeking allies as well as military bases in Ukraine and other former Soviet Republics and using its wealth (energy in Russia’s case) as foreign aid to friendly governments. (There are many other examples.)
4. And, barely noticed, the development of new nuclear weapons on both sides.

If this new chapter of the Cold War continues to unfold, it may be the most dangerous one ever, for several reasons:

- Its geopolitical focus has moved from Central Europe to the very center of Russia’s traditional zone of security, its “near abroad,” in a growing and exceedingly provocative military encirclement.
- At the same time, there are dangerously conflicting American and Russian self-perceptions. The United States, now the self-professed “only superpower,” has a much more expansive view of its own international entitlements than it did before 1992. (Indeed, Washington’s winner-take-all policy toward post-

Soviet Russia is significantly more aggressive than was its approach to Communist Russia.) Russia, on the other hand, is much weaker and less secure than it was before 1992, and thus both less stable and less predictable.

- There is an equally grave psychological factor: this chapter of the American-Soviet Cold War is undeclared, unfolding, at least until recently, behind a façade of pseudo-“partnership and friendship,” and as a result already teeming with mutual resentments over perceived broken promises and betrayals. (The psychological factor will be even more dangerous if these developments cause Moscow to conclude that the American Cold War was really primarily against Russia, not Communism. as many Russians already believe.)
- Nor are there today any significant détente-like relations between Washington and Moscow. Most alarming, negotiations for reducing nuclear weapons have in effect been terminated by this Bush Administration’s unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and by the essentially meaningless nuclear reductions agreement it imposed on Moscow in 2002. And all this, including new buildups on both sides, while Russia’s means of fully controlling its existing nuclear devices are less reliable than they were under the Soviet system.
- Finally, hardline Cold War elites have always been much stronger in both capitals than pro-détente forces, and even more so than Cold War abolitionists. That is why the possibility of easing or ending the Cold War has always required a transcendent leader — first, Roosevelt, later Gorbachev. But is such a leader possible today? It is hard to imagine one emerging anytime soon in the United States, where the new Cold War policy toward Russia is developing with full bipartisan support—the Edwards/Kemp «report» issued this month by the «non-partisan» Council on Foreign Relations being a particularly telling and lamentable example — and, unlike in the past, without any significant elite, media, or popular opposition. As for Russia, it is true that Gorbachev emerged out of the conservative Soviet nomenklatura, to the great surprise of most Western specialists. But Moscow commentators tell us that today’s Russian elite is more corruptly self-interested and less visionary than was its Soviet predecessor, certainly than Gorbachev’s reform-minded “generation of the 20th Party Congress.”

Should I conclude, therefore, with an apology to Mikhail Sergeevich for having challenged, on the eve of his birthday, the claim so often made on his behalf — that he ended the Cold War?

In my view, the tragic reality of that missed opportunity does not diminish Gorbachev’s greatness in history. Not even the greatest reform leader — and still less a heretical one, as Gorbachev certainly was — can himself actually transform his own country or the world. He can only give the rest of us an opportunity, which we did not have before, to do so. At home, Gorbachev gave Russia an opportunity to continue an unprecedented evolutionary political and economic reformation, which it did not take. And he gave my country an opportunity to end the almost century-long Cold War, which we did not take.

When historians eventually write the real history of the era of Gorbachev, and its lost alternatives, they therefore will judge the rest of us very harshly — if, that is, there are any survivors to write it.

Or we may hope, in Mikhail Sergeevich’s always optimistic spirit, that the alternatives he gave us are not yet irretrievably lost.

Discussion presentations

Fedor Lukjanov,

Editor-in-Chief, magazine "Russia In the Global World"

There were several funerals of the Cold War. The first was in the 1990s and the relatively recent one — when NATO expanded to the East and when Russian military facilities in Cuba and Vietnam were closed. Each time there was a stately announcement that this page in the history book has been turned over forever. But the specter is quite tenacious nonetheless. We can hear the then confrontation echoed and re-echoed, — something that seems to have grown louder and louder lately. To be sure, one can attribute this to the political thinking inertia, which simply cannot catch up with the tide of change. But there is often an impression that things are much worse than that.

The Cold War is alive not through inertia but because former opponents still need it as a foundation for their political self-identification. Indeed, there is still nothing to replace it with, nothing to properly fill its ideological vacuum.

The epoch connected with the Cold War was an epoch of ideologies. But the end of the confrontation in the late 1980s did not signify the end of ideology. Rather, this was the beginning of a very rampant and interesting period, a boom of ideological quests aimed to find something that can really unite former adversaries. I think this was a period of most sincere though, perhaps, quite naïve hopes.

The termination of the Cold War (as was said many times today) was a manifestation of goodwill on the part of its participants. The absence of this goodwill on the part of either of the superpowers would have drastically affected the course of events. The awareness of this phenomenon would have provided a unique historical chance, a chance to turn the end of confrontation into a joint project instead of the victory of one system over the other. But

at the turn of the 1990s this chance was missed. The “winner — loser” model was a deliberate choice because, strange as it might seem, it suited both parties. It is clear why it suited the West. Meanwhile in our country there were events that allowed this image to be used in the interests of the Soviet domestic policy.

The line of least resistance was followed, so today we are witnessing its results. The chief feature of the present-day situation is the profound crisis of all customary ideologies.

In those twenty years that elapsed after the beginning of reforms in the Soviet Union we have achieved one fundamental common result: all basic development models have been discredited or recognized as unfitting Russian specificity. First, we discarded the Soviet model that had run its course and then — the liberal model oriented at the West. Due to the specificity of its implementation it did not appeal to the majority of the population. And, finally, the model of a certain authoritarian modernization from top (we can call it Asiatic, if you like) on which many people, including convinced liberals were placing hopes in the beginning of this decade.

Discussions about modernization abated by their own momentum having confronted formidable resistance of the material. Bureaucracy that was conceived as the chief propellant of transformation turned out to be an environment that can block any positive impetus.

These three models have only one thing in common: all of them were based on explicit ideological premises. Their failure resulted in the current state of things when the absence of any ideology is disguised in the multitude of its external attributes and the invention of various artificial designs, like the ideas of “sovereign democracy” or “behavior of energy superpowers”.

These concepts are not an ideological basis behind the unfolding processes. On the contrary, they are a more or less expertly arranged superstructure designed to serve as a shell for the already established and prevalent political and economic practices. That means we are facing an inverted process. Formerly pol-

itics was derived from ideology, while now politics is derived from ideology.

When there is a deficit of reference points, the ideological basis is formed from whatever is available, and, in the absence of other things, the available is the heritage of the Cold War as something well familiar and clearly structured. Especially because the idea of the defeat, which, according to the prevalent set of opinion, the Soviet Union had sustained in that War, cherished the readily fostered feeling of vulnerability and revenge seeking. And politicians know very well the way to manipulate these feelings.

Strange as it might seem, but the situation on the opposite side is turning into a mirror reflection of the confusion that prevails on our side of the former Iron Curtain. The end of history that never came — although declared — brought about a surprising phenomenon. The ideals of democracy that had served a guiding star throughout the Cold War and prevailed over the rival system of views did not blossom out in the world free of communism. They are becoming even more instrumental in their character.

An intricate and quaint intertwining of a sincere democratic messianism with the pursuit of explicitly cynical geopolitical interests, — such intertwining being absolutely natural for the neo-conservative ideology that is dominant today in the United States, — can inflict by far greater damage on the notion of democracy than the entire communist propaganda.

The idea of compulsory free elections is gradually turning into a technology of democratic procedures and often renders them devoid of sense.

And, finally, the idea of using military force for humanitarian purposes usually creates a greater number of problems than it actually resolves. In this sense it turns out that democracy, having acquired “hard” force, begins to swiftly lose its soft force that made it so strong before. The disappearance of the opponent that seemed to have acted as the chief brake on the harmonic global development actually baffled the conventional winner.

Responses to the threats and challenges generated by the new world situation have been impossible to find within the former

paradigm. But, while looking for these responses the advanced world is sliding into its habitual stereotype and keeps moving in the direction set by the collapse of communism, i.e. toward enclosing the former adversary.

This is the point where the two parties have closed down upon each other so as to discover in each other many new signs of reciprocal estrangement. Instinctively they are trying to build back the ideological structure of the past that used to be so stable and clear. Indeed, the chimera of universal struggle against terrorism that claims to be playing the part of a universal and comprehensive ideology is capable of playing this part no better than the idea of an “energy superpower”. In so doing, it is also devoid of the stabilization effect that once maintained the bygone type of opposition.

Those who ended the Cold War never filled ideological vacuum that had appeared after the Cold War stopped. This vacuum is now being filled in spite of their will. In my opinion, the sudden upheaval of religious feelings is a real attempt to fill the now vacant niche of ideologies. The threat to democratic values that got the upper hand in the Cold War comes not only from everyone’s obsession with the problem of security that has engulfed the whole world but, instead, it has revealed an inrush of virtually medieval consciousness into the high-tech world of the 21st century. Indeed, the awakened sense of religious identity that seemed to have been totally dormant both in the West and in the recently fully atheist Russia is a response to the radical Islam.

To my belief, the most noteworthy development of “ludicrous” passions in Europe and the Middle East was the address made by two Danish bishops who reminded that the Moslems who burnt down Danish flags committed blasphemy because there was the Christian cross on the flags. One can hardly remember any other occasion in the past when the inhabitants of the liberal and thoroughly secular Denmark recalled having a religious symbol on their flag.

Regrettably, the memory of the Cold War continues as the pivotal element of politics because other supports are missing. But the problem is that it cannot replace a real ideology, while against the background of awakened political engagement that we are wit-

nessing everywhere in the world the great powers are simply inadequate in their behavior. Both Cold War belligerents run the risk of being defeated by a force that proves really much stronger and by far more attractive than they are.

Viacheslav Nikonov,
President, "Politika" Foundation

The answer to the question about what the Cold War has ended in laid the strongest division line between Russia and the West. Opposite interpretations of things that happened in the late 1980s and early 1990s form the basis behind many current contradictions.

The West's dominant interpretation is its "victory in the Cold War". By means of its pressure, arms race, "star wars", and the power of democratic ideas the West allegedly forced M.S. Gorbachev and the Soviet Union to surrender in the Cold War. The West won a full and unqualified victory. Over whom? It was a victory over the country that was always, at all times and in all its forms, known by the name of Russia.

From here ensues the treatment of Russia as a defeated nation. For instance, this was the attitude to France after Napoleonic wars. Russia was treated as a nation that was not supposed to have its own foreign policy. The downfall of the Soviet Union was interpreted exclusively as the fall of an empire. And, therefore, any moves toward reintegration were perceived the empire's resurgence. Consequently, there was a desire to make Russia's neighbors keep distance from Russia and create what Zbigniew Brzezinski called a situation of "geopolitical pluralism" in the post-Soviet territory.

In fact, this was a minor transformation of the policy of containment. This time it was a containment of Russia within its new borders. In this setting Russia was increasingly seen as a country that could not be integrated in the Western structures. Russia was too big and too Russian for the West. Russia was impossible to integrate in NATO because that would be the end of NATO. Russia was impossible to integrate in the European Union because the

European Union was not strong enough to manage such a huge country with such a weak economy.

But the main point was this: the security architecture that had existed at the time of the Cold War remained fully intact in the West. And instead of thinking about a new architecture after the end of the Cold War they started thinking about how they could adapt to the new conditions the old structures whose many elements had been created in conformity to the logic of the Cold War and geared to its goals.

At the time, at the turn of the 1990s, there was a historical chance both for Russia and for the West to melt into an entity, and this major historical chance was missed. M.S. Gorbachev voiced these ideas, the ideas of a Common European Home, on many occasions. It seemed that Russia could share an affinity with the West within a club of civilized states. But, unfortunately, the West perceived this differently because it had a different interpretation of the development and of what the Cold War had ended in.

It stands to reason that in Russia, too, there are people who believe that Russia did loose the Cold War. And, therefore, we better stay put and not get in the way when the West was turning Russia into a "normal state". In fact, this is the mainstream of Russian liberal thinking. But the mainstream of Russian liberal thinking is quite a marginal ideological and political trend in contemporary Russian politics.

The majority of people, among whom are the participants of those events including M.S. Gorbachev, do not think that Russia has lost the Cold War. They think that Russia displayed wisdom when it stopped the war to the advantage of our country and the rest of the world. Russia should have been thanked and treated as an equal partner who has its own legitimate interests.

Besides, when the Cold War ended many new states acceded to sovereignty and received freedom of the seas. Integration or reintegration with those states seemed to Moscow as natural as breathing. Treating Russia as a defeated enemy as well as its containment, including the post-Soviet territory, is seen as gross ingratitude.

At present the forces that advocated a fusion of Russia and the West into an entity are practically non-existent in Russia. They were quite effectively eliminated by developments like the extension of NATO, the war in Yugoslavia and the war in Iraq, which reduced the pro-Western forces to a minimum.

The difference of opinion as to what was happening in the end of the Cold War also brought about very serious frustration. The West assumed that as a result of “being defeated in the Cold War” Russia should quickly become an immaculate democracy and a pro-Western country. Russia assumed it would be admitted to the club and would be given money under the new Marshall Plan. When neither happened, there began frustration — deep-seated on both sides.

It would be good if Western politicians stopped seeing Russia as a defeated nation because this leads to very serious political miscalculations.

As for us, we should not be euphoric in talking about wonderful geopolitical success scored as a result of ending the Cold War. But, obviously, we have lost the world after the Cold War. And we did this together.

The prospect of a joint future for Russia and for the West now seems by far less probable than fifteen years back. The feeling is maturing in Russia that it is doomed to remain a sovereign center of strength in the modern world and that it cannot be integrated in any other groupings. That it does not need to be a member of the European Union because the EU is a too tightly regulated organization apart from being a zone of economic stagnation, and that Russia does not need to be a member of NATO because in the present situation when it is seen as a defeated country it is better to enjoy a free hand in the military-political sphere.

Today Russia and the West are definitely drifting apart. And this means that the ideal world that could have been built after the end of the Cold War on the basis of the civilization’s unity involving the Nordic countries and Russia, which perceived itself as a Euro-Pacific and not as a Euro-Asian center of strength, — this configuration is becoming less and less likely.

Well, the world is not perfect. When Albert Einstein left this world and came before our Lord’s eyes, he asked: “Oh, All-Mighty! Can you write the supreme formula of the Universe? All my life I was thinking this formula over and I could not deduce it”. And God replied: “No problem!” He took a sheet of paper, wrote the formula and gave the paper to Einstein. Einstein looked at it and said: “My God, there is an error in this”. “I am aware of it”, God said.

Lilia Shevtsova,
Professor of History, the Carnegie Endowment

I cannot help commenting on the issue of the end of the Cold War. I would like to share my viewpoint as a person who is looking at the world and international relations through the prism of domestic policy. So, this is not going to be an approach of a specialist in international relations. I rest assured that the Cold War in its traditional format (it unfolded as an opposition of the two alternative civilizations, which, in the first place, aspired to global influence; secondly, used nuclear confrontation in order to achieve this influence; and, third, claimed a monopoly of their respective ideologies) is over. This is the end of the story. And due to various circumstances there is no going back to the Cold War in this format, first and foremost because its chief actors withdrew from the scene. And the honor of putting a full stop in this story belongs to Gorbachev who thereby altered the trajectory in the development of the world order. He was the last USSR leader and the first leader of a new era, a politician who made the world and the West look for responses to the challenges that he had brought about by his “new thinking” and rejection of bi-polarity. What is now happening in the world arena testifies to the effect that the world has not yet found answers to the questions that Gorbachev faced it with.

Although the old story is over, there are situational and systemic factors that generate a new logic of the “cold” and “cool” thinking, i.e. this is a new situation. This logic may encourage the restitution of a new Cold War or, as a minimum, of a “cold containment”. As a matter of fact, we can see all signs of this mutual containment that involve various states, including the West, China and Russia. Basic to this containment are both geopolitical and current

interests as well as incompatibility of value standards and world outlooks. I would like to formulate this issue in more concrete terms: the developments that we are observing today in the Middle East, in the territory of the former Soviet Union, in certain regions of South-East Asia (relations between China and Japan) constitute a new form of the Cold War. It displays many elements that can confuse or even reassure. The form of international relations that we are witnessing now has many elements of a dialogue, of cooperation and partnership. One is growing more aware of the latent factor of mutual distrust and suspicion. This feeling in the relations between the West and Russia is already hard to hide.

Why have we failed to put an end to the “cold thinking”? What does it hide? What are the situational and what are the systemic factors within this phenomenon? Frankly speaking, I have no satisfactory answer to these questions. Allow me to follow my line of reasoning aloud but without claiming that I know the ultimate truth. I believe that among the situational factors that have revived the “cold thinking” in the relations between Russia and the West mention must be made of the first extension of NATO that awakened the dormant stereotypes of hostility in the minds of the Russian political class, which had failed to find other ways of its self-identification. The Russian elite perceived the NATO’s extension as an encroachment on the Russian statehood that it viewed as a strong government with its own sphere of influence. There were other reasons that worked along the same line. Among them was the need that Russia restricted its own global appetites, — something that is seen as a retreat in the face of the West. The case in point is that Moscow has been compelled to put up with the unilateral US abandonment of the ABM system, with the extension of the US presence in the post-Soviet territory and with the admission of the Baltic States to the EU.

Besides, there are, of course, the situational factors about which Stephen Cohen was talking. I am talking about the West’s “double standards” revealed in the course of the crisis in Yugoslavia, during the war in Iraq and in the attitude of Western democracies to authoritarian and totalitarian regimes — connivance at pro-US regimes (in Pakistan, for example) and criticism of anti-Western regimes of a similar kind (attitude to Byelorussia).

Whenever advanced democracies break their standards, this immediately makes Russia feel disillusioned in the Western democracy model and instigates suspicion toward the Western states as an embodiment of this ideology.

But so far I have been talking about the situational causes for a cooling down in the relations between Russia and the West. What are the systemic causes? When talking about systemic features I assume that we should not confine ourselves merely to manifestations and consequences. We should go ahead and reflect upon the essence of things. The problem is not only keeping the memory of the Cold War (Fedor Lukjanov spoke very well on this topic). The problem is not merely the ideas that are wandering in our sick and healthy minds. The problem is not merely ideas, notions and stereotypes. This, indeed, takes us to quite a materialist question: what are the prerequisites for sustaining these ideas, memory and “cold mentality”? It is high time that we stated the clear-cut reason, without resorting to altercation, that the Russian political class is not prepared and not able to fill the niche that Gorbachev and his associates created having thereby caused the downfall of the bipolar world and the dismantlement of the very foundation behind the Cold War as a nuclear and ideological confrontation.

Gorbachev completed the project of the Soviet civilization but nothing conceptually new ever grew in its place. Having proven unable to formalize the new project and having no wish to accept the rules of the liberal democracy’s game, the post-Soviet political class and its intellectual entourage attempted to preserve themselves by means of going back to the fragments of the old setup, by reviving stereotypes and traditions and actually by suspending Russia in an ambiguous situation. Let me underscore that we are facing attempts to revive the past without having necessary resources for its maintenance, i.e. I am talking about the simulation of the former backbone factors, including great power statehood, strength, sovereignty, greatness, ambitions, etc. The fact that some colleagues are so much inspired when talking about the time of the Cold War obviously taking pride in that time is also part of this quite unconscious simulation game and a fresh proof that the post-Soviet elite was incapable of creating anything after Gorbachev stepped down.

This absence of a modernist civilization project is the main systemic cause that revived the “cold” containment — but on a different level and on a limited scale. It stands to reason that this cooling down needs an enemy’s image and mobilization rhetoric. Whenever you watch any analytical program on Russian TV or attend a political gathering either in or out of Moscow or listen to some of us sitting in this conference room, you get a confirmation of our desire to ascertain ourselves at present by means of going back to the setup that existed before perestroika.

The logic of movement within the “cold” or “cool” space is pushing Russia and the West not only to the attempts of mutual containment but also to conflicts in the former Soviet territory. There are three words — “Ukraine, Byelorussia, Georgia” — that are a sign of warning: here Russia and the West may come into a collision course if Russia continues its indeterminate movement. At the same time Russia is not prepared either to confront the West or distance from it. The Russian political class would like to continue the “partner — adversary” game while cooperating with the West in the areas that do not threaten its political interests and counteracting the West there where this political class feels vulnerable or where its interests of survival in the old paradigm are at stake. But, sooner or later, the second part of the formula will hinder the implementation of the first part: partnership is unviable without cooperation and without a common view of the world.

And at this point I am going over to a paradox. Joe Nye spoke about paradoxes. While dealing with paradoxes I beg to differ with Mr. Anatoly Adamishin whom I respect very much. He said that Russia faced an alternative: either to surrender to the West or to wage a war against it. I have a different view of the choice faced by Russia’s political class but not by Russia as a nation. I believe this political class was surprisingly skillful and successful in safeguarding its own interests having formed a new attitude to reality and to the rest of the world. Its goal is as follows: to become integrated in the West and in Europe at the personal level while keeping the West and Europe shut for the Russian society. To employ a metaphor, our elite, having opened Europe to serve its own ends, closed Europe for society. The reason is obvious: Russian political class

simply cannot cope with a normal, open and free society. This elite is incapable of ruling a different society. In a different society this elite will not be an elite anymore. It can only rule society that it is duping with horror stories about NATO, the NATO tanks in the outskirts of Poltava, the threat that comes from the West, the loss of Russia’s sovereignty and about Ukraine or Belarus becoming pro-Western. All this places us in deadly peril. But this rubbish is the most important thing for society. The elite itself likes to keep in touch with the Western political class. It is doing its best to look civilized while trying to muddle the West’s brain by talking about underdevelopment and barbarity of people in Russia and about Putin being the only European person in Russia — except themselves, of course. This shows that Russian elite surrendered to the West a long time ago but it is trying to look belligerent lest Russian society should find out this surrender.

And my last point: on the tentative development scenarios of the Russian Hybrid. I can see two scenarios, and both are bad. The first scenario is the continued simulation. Mr. Nikonov has just supplied a brilliant example of this. Within this scenario the Russian elite and its propagandists will be proving that Russia is neither the West nor the East but, rather, something in between. In simplistic terms, Russia is a cat that walks by himself. In fact, once again we face a claim that Russia is “too special” and this should allow to preserve both the present system that has the appearance of being democratic while having a bureaucratic and totalitarian essence and its foreign policy that boils down to the same “partner — adversary” hybrid. This scenario means playing semblance and claiming something that is not backed with resources. And it is most likely that the West will agree to play this game because it has no chance of exercising influence on the course of events in Russia.

The other alternative is a clearer orientation at a “cool peace” with various degrees of cold and a more explicit distance keeping between Russia and the West. In Russia’s domestic policy this means a stronger centralization and dissociation of government from society. The result of both scenarios is the same — Russia’s marginalization and isolation; Russia will push itself out of the civilization space.

And my very last point. It is quite good that Mr. Gorbachev is not in the conference room right now. In his absence I can be free and easy in speaking about the possible role that he can play in the present situation. I sincerely believe that Mr. Gorbachev who will have an important jubilee the day after tomorrow does not bear any responsibility to us, to his Foundation or to history. He bears responsibility to the future. This responsibility and Gorbachev's freedom of the citizen of the world allow him to openly raise the question about the ways that can prevent Russia from sliding into cold or cool peace. Besides, he can undertake another mission and help the West understand that it is Russia that bids a global challenge to the Western civilization and, incidentally, that the future of the West also depends on Russia. Thank you.

Pavel Palazhchenko

*Adviser to the President, International and Media Relations,
the Gorbachev Foundation*

In today's interesting discussion, not much has been said about the developments over the past fifteen years. Let me say something about it, not so much by way of profound analysis as by way of observation. It seems to me that during these years, the policies of the West, on the one hand, and of Russia on the other were driven more by "subtext" than by the "text," i.e. official doctrines, statements, etc. What I mean is that beside the Russian foreign policy strategy — a document approved at the highest level — and the similar US documents there the subtext, a kind of "collective unconscious" of the foreign policy makers on both sides.

So, what was contained in that "collective unconscious?" On the US side, the Western side, it has been, mostly, the idea of avoiding another cold war. The west does not want a new cold war with Russia, even though it is still suspicious of Russia for reasons that include some of Russia's actions that cause concern and apprehensions in the West, sometimes understandable sometimes less so. But because of the emphasis on avoiding the cold war the West has been soft-pedaling many of those concerns, being rather tolerant of some aspects of Russia's recent policies.

Another thing the West very much wants to avoid is a cold war with China. China has been very rarely mentioned today but I think that what really focuses the minds of the US foreign policy establishment is how to avoid a cold war with China. In this regard, the lessons of the cold war, as described here very aptly by Dr. Nye, are certainly being taken into account.

As for Russia, I think the subtext of Russia's policy over the past fifteen years has been the desire to restore a proper role for Russia in the international arena. There is a strong feeling in the Russian establishment that Russia has lost a great deal — either as a result of the end of the cold war or during the period that followed.

I think that both these "subtexts" are right and proper as ingredients in the conceptual basis of foreign policy. It is true that we need to avoid a new cold war. It is true that Russia deserves a more substantial role in world affairs. But, as an intellectual basis for foreign policy, these "subtexts" are not nearly enough. So the question is what would be an appropriate basis for post-cold war international relations.

Not as a compliment to Mikhail Gorbachev, I believe that we should seek such a basis in what he was proposing. We need a joint project of cooperation in building a new international architecture, a new, equitable and democratic international order — based, of course, on some old and fairly well known principles of international law enriched with a new understanding of the problems the world faces in the XXI century.

Viacheslav Nikonov has said here that the idea that Russia and the West would merge into a single whole is not popular now and it is pointless to propose anything of this kind. He may well be right. But we don't have to "merge into a single whole" in order to work together in developing such a project for new world architecture.

I believe that reaffirming this goal, reaffirming the ideas of international governance — as Gorbachev likes to emphasize, it is not the same as "world government" but a measure of global governance is necessary — would be a much better basis for foreign

policy making both in the West and in Russia than the two subtexts that we have now.

Vladimir Baranovsky,
Member-Correspondent, Russian Academy of Sciences

For people of my generation the reminiscence about the beginning of Gorbachev's epoch is primarily the memory of an absolutely admirable sense of hope, the hope than something could be seriously changed. This feeling that appeared thanks to Gorbachev gave an extremely powerful impetus to people's commitment.

My experience was connected with my work in an institute of the Academy of Science. My colleagues and I suddenly understood that those who made practical policy needed the analysis of international problems that we were doing and that our ideas were indispensable in order to overcome the military and political confrontation, to lay the new foundation of European security and to make future the cornerstone of international affairs. We were asked to think, to overcome stereotypes (which everybody had — the government, society and citizens) and to offer concrete solutions. After some time we could see that these ideas were embodied in negotiations and agreements and became instrumental in undoing tight knots and setting the agenda of the international political process. Of course, there were illusions and mistakes, but as far as I can remember this was an unparalleled experience when ideas coming from the professional community were so heavily demanded in government politics.

There are several points that I want to raise while going back to the issue that is the subject matter of our discussion today. First of all, I think it is quite appropriate that we talked about who won the Cold War and who lost it. Certainly, this is an interesting topic to discuss but one must start with making clear what is a victory and what is a defeat because one can supply a very convincing set of proofs in favor of both interpretations.

But there are also certain absolutely obvious things. It is obvious that without Gorbachev the confrontation — in the form of a protracted and exhausting opposition between our country and the

West — could continue a very long time. It could make us waste a lot of political energy and physical efforts and produce tremendous negative consequences for our country. I believe this fact is unquestionable irrespective of how we interpret the issue of the end of the Cold War.

Another obvious thing, as I see it, lies in the need not to confine the end of the Cold War exclusively to the changes in our relations with the USA. Generally speaking, the analysis of the Cold War must rely on a much broader context. It was not just a phenomenon that dealt with the Soviet-American relations or the relations between our country and the West. The case in point was a phenomenon on a much larger scale, a model of international relations actually comprising the greater part of processes unfolding in the world arena. In fact, this was a global model. Vietnam, Angola and Nicaragua fitted in it. It even incorporated China, which seemed to have set itself free from the Procrustean bed of Soviet-American bipolarity, nonetheless originated from the Cold War realities and was tightly embedded in these realities.

Whenever we ask whether or not the Cold War receded into the past or when we think about its lessons it is important that we made clear the meaning of the expression — “the Cold War”. And there is something obvious in this respect, too. For instance, obvious are the negative connotations associated therewith. Just recall the cartoons of the Soviet time: the Cold War's symbol was a wicked witch with icicles dangling from her nose or there were other, equally revolting images. This image reflects intellectual associations that are quite rightful. My colleague Mr. Suprun reminded us about one of these images when he spoke about the connection of the Cold War with the stagnation phenomenon.

It is important, however, that we did not confine ourselves exclusively to this aspect in our vision of the Cold War phenomenon. To be sure, if we lay emphasis on the word “war”, it stands to reason that war is worse than peace. But one should not forget that the “Cold War” in this context is much better than a “hot war. The Cold War is a much more attractive form of relations between states than any other form of a war.

The Cold War is a result of combining two elements. One of them is the high level of mutual hostility (I am leaving the issue of its origin beyond the scope of this discussion). The other was unwillingness to drive this hostility to a head-on collision. There may be various reasons for this unwillingness but at this point we shall leave them aside.

These two elements are present in any situation that is identified with the expression “the Cold War”. And if we leave aside the issue of where hostility comes from or why there was unwillingness to instigate a collision there will be nothing left but sheer platitudes. Because we are not living in an ideal world. We are living in a real world where individuals have different, if not opposite pragmatic interests, value guidelines, emotional predilections and antipathies — everything that can give rise to hostility. But the reasons for developing this hostility into a war are numerous enough.

Thus, if one assigns primary importance to these two parameters he will discover that the phenomenon of the Cold War arises in the contemporary life and in international relations much more often than this expression is used. As such, this phenomenon is much broader in its character than the fragment of historical reality to which we conventionally relate it.

First, a few words on the hostility parameter. The end of the Cold War manifested the end of hostility between the East and the West. Let us accept this as a maxim and set aside all the trifles. For instance, we shall not pay attention to the fact that one of the confronting sides was gone when confrontation stopped, and in terms of its significance the former proved more grandiose an event than the latter. Within the framework of the topic at hand something else is important — the fact that the probability of restoring the opposition in traditional dichotomy parameters “socialism/communism versus capitalism/liberalism” has been actually reduced to a naught.

But alongside this there emerged and gained prominence other axes of hostility.

One of them was much talked about as far back as in the 1970s. The case in point is the opposition along the North — South

axis or between the rich and the poor or between the “golden billion” and the rest — choose whatever you like. What is not clear is the degree to which we can soften this opposition in absolute parameters. Even less obvious are the prospects of reducing its international political effects.

The second axis became explicit in the limelight of dramatic events in September 2001. I have in mind everything that is connected with international terrorism. Some people believe that the world — as a result — became bipolar again but in keeping with this new division marker. On the one side are those who placed themselves beyond the civilized world and on the other side are all the rest. Whether or not it is appropriate to talk about the inception of bipolarity on the basis mentioned above is a case apart. But the fact that the problems of combating terrorism became expressly salient in international politics testifies to the dangerous turbulences in the contemporary world.

The third axis of the potential (if not quite real) confrontation is formed on the basis of divergences and difference in terms of religious confession and civilization — when they acquire an actively hostile vector in relation to the “aliens” and become a powerful driver of processes taking place in the international political sphere. We are witnessing this in the area of relations between the Moslem and non-Moslem world.

There are several things that confuse me. I feel confused because all these hostility axes are what one can see with a naked eye. These are not some latent processes. They are a reality that strikes the eye. I feel confused because we have easily, at a moment’s notice, counted three lines of serious confrontation. Of course, they are inter-related but each has a being of its own. Three is much more than one that prevailed during the years of the Cold War.

And, at last, I feel confused because one sees a high level of ideology concentration along all the three axes. If we compare this with the time of the Cold War, then we can remember that the ideological parameters of confrontation between the East and the West played a very important role but they were not the only foundation of this confrontation. On the contrary, there existed a theory

that was quite clear-cut in its logic according to which the ideological aspect was, in the long run, nothing more than a false front for the geopolitical confrontation. Today all the three concepts of the dichotomy-based confrontation (the poor — the rich, terrorist — non-terrorists, Moslems — non-Moslems) are literally brimming with ideological content. And if a new cold war grows out of this, its background will be tougher than the one behind the old Cold War.

If we take another parameter — when we focus our attention on restraint in applying force — there are several signals that put us on guard.

First: the logic, imperatives and instincts of geopolitical behavior still persist in the policy of those countries that were the chief players in the international political arena during the Cold War.

Second: new power centers are being formed within the international system. Against this background all the talking about future bipolarity — as a replica of the system that constituted the geopolitical centerpiece, the geopolitical core of the Cold War — do not at all look far-fetched.

And third: nowadays force is used in international affairs more often and, importantly, with less doubts than during the Cold War.

My conclusion: The Cold War is a phenomenon in the past if one has in mind the concrete historical form in which it existed nearly forty years — from the late 1940s to late 1980s. But history did not come to an end. Today we are discovering quite often that the confrontation soil on which the Cold War grows is even more fertile nowadays than at the time. But the stabilization effect of the new cold wars unlike its first edition is questionable: there is less restraint in international affairs and everything is more disorderly while the structural clarity (“us”? “them?”) does not exist.

So the way out from this spiral may be a more difficult affair. Especially because we cannot see any signs of the new edition of the “new thinking”.

Conclusion

Mikhail Gorbachev:

“We lack a deep understanding of modern realities. This is the reason why politics make no progress.”

I want to express my opinion on one more topic — the chances that opened and existed after the end of the Second World War.

The nations expected that after the war and the defeat of fascism the allies would go along the line of building a new world based on the victory, the achievements and real cooperation. This was the feeling everywhere: in the Soviet Union and in the United States. The feeling was there. It was also the feeling in the UN. But W. Churchill, “the devil”, whose Award I have been given, could see Great Britain receding into the background in this state of things. Even after he stepped down as Prime Minister he could not take it easy. There ensued Churchill’s speech in Fulton. I was a youth of 17 at the time and I remember a column in the “Pravda” under the title “Churchill is Rattling the Sabre”.

Indeed, what was lacking then was a vision, an understanding of opportunities that opened at the time.

Mankind is simply haunted by ill fate — an absence of adequate vision, lack of understanding of the changing world. And people endowed with the vision of a prophet were dealt shortly with.

Let us recall (not so distant a past) John Kennedy. On June 10, 1963, five months before he was killed, John Kennedy made a presentation at a university in Washington D.C. and he said amazing things (I am quoting him almost verbatim): if you imagine that the future world will be a Pax Americana I must tell you: *it will either be a world for everybody, or there will be no world at all.* So

President of the United States of America was saying something inappropriate. But then the plot thickens and complications begin to set in. As for the Soviet Union, when we criticize communism we shouldn't demonize the Soviet people. They were human, just as we are. They wanted to have a happy life. They wanted their children and their grandchildren to be happy

Amazing philosophical and political generalizations of this sort were supposed to have laid the groundwork for developing the concept of cooperation. Kennedy said this one year after the Caribbean crisis that had shocked everybody.

Just a few months later Kennedy was killed. I think there is a straight connection between his death and the speech. In the museum in Dallas I wrote in the guest book that some people got rid of Kennedy. A president gets killed in much praised USA because he was out of reactionaries' favor. Eisenhower had been warning John Kennedy about the sinister role of the US military industrial complex. He, too, had been taken down a peg. This is how it goes. But this effort was not in vain. In the mid-1980s it became possible to arrest the arms race and begin a reduction of nuclear as well as other classes of weapons.

At the time there was a group of people at the political level who were aware of the real threat inherent in a nuclear conflict. They made up their mind ... They understood the danger of the aggravated confrontation. It was necessary to alter the logic of confrontation and replace it with cooperation. The new thinking was a vision based on a new approach to the developments in the world and an adequate political determination.

Collective leadership came about. Ninety per cent of all nuclear weapons was in the US and the USSR, so it stands to reason that their role and responsibility were more significant.

Where did it come to the end? We said it came to the end in Malta. At the Malta summit we said: "We do not see each other as opponents any longer". It was the first time in the entire history of Soviet — American relations that we had a joint press conference.

What is the main lesson that I draw from this review for the contemporary world politics? We lack a deep understanding of

modern realities. This is the reason why politics make no progress. The work of scientific research center must be different. They must equip us with the necessary knowledge about the contemporary world.

At present international non-government organizations are saying it is necessary to bring pressure on policy. It is important to have a policy adequate of the contemporary world.

What do we require? We are being told that leaders appear when the time requires them. This is true but we are lacking leadership today. Today leadership can only be collective.

I believe that united Europe must become the locomotive of the world's new processes. It has a formidable diplomatic, political and cultural potential and rich experience. No matter what failures we have been facing in the national and ethnic sphere, Europe accumulated rich experience of co-existence between nations and religions and a dialogue between cultures.

In a word, this meeting is important as never before, and when our book is published we shall carry across the main message of the discussion that we had here.

Annex

The End of the Cold War

Letter from Wojciech Jaruzelski, Former President of Poland

For a number of reasons, I cannot attend the celebrations of Mikhail Gorbachev's 75th birthday and the conference "From Fulton to Malta: How the Cold War Began and Ended". Neither can I speak personally on the proposed subject of The End of the Cold War. So I can only present some of my ideas in writing. Besides, I had to make my presentation rather general due to certain difficulties with access to many relevant documents and materials.

Four great wars have raged through Europe and the world in the last 200 years. Three of them that ended in 1815, 1918, and 1945, were "hot" and one that started shortly after World War II, "cold". Yet the end of the Cold War cannot be related to a concrete date, for it was not a historical event but a historical stage. Its appraisals may naturally be different, tentative or subjective. To me, that stage started in 1985-1986 and ended in 1989-1990. But there had already been prerequisites for it. The economic and social effects of the arms race were getting increasingly pronounced, especially in the USSR. The situation could, however, last for some time. Soviet society was patient. The memories of World War II and the deadly peril of the time only added to the conviction that building up national defense was a sacred duty. I remember my years in Siberia and the slogan "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory", deeply imprinted in people's minds. The war threat was regarded as a permanent condition, rising in times of international crises. It was coupled with the increasing awareness that it was no longer possible to go on like that. I felt that clearly during my first five-hour conversation with Mikhail

Gorbachev in April 1985. As a politician, I shared the idea of putting the brakes on the spiraling arms race. As an army officer, I saw fast technological changes in NATO's armaments, including the *Bundeswehr* potential. The western border issue that needed a final settlement with the FGR had always been Poland's major concern.

It was indeed hard for the Soviet military with their rich war experience to put up with the fact that their powerful armor and artillery arsenals could not match advanced military technologies in NATO and especially in the USA. I may somewhat simplify the situation, but I was under the impression that there were two "schools of thought" at the time. The first, which had dominated for long, supported the idea of parity and even a slight superiority as a guarantee of peace and stability. The second sought solutions to ensure security at lesser costs through bilateral arms limitations. I find it hard to appraise the logic of NATO's military representatives, but I think similar approaches existed there too.

The Warsaw Treaty Organization had faults of its own, including the bloc states' limited sovereignty. It was often demonized as a potential aggressor preparing to attack and conquer Western Europe. Declassified documents and maps show arrows pointing to the west, hundreds of hypothetical nuclear attacks, and so on — how horrible! The picture, however, seems deficient without declassified NATO documents of that period, which would add to a complete and objective view into the situation. Why? Gen. Klaus Naumann, the Bundeswehr Inspector General and (since February 14, 1995) the NATO Military Committee Chairman, said in the interview published by the Polish magazine *Wprost* on February 14, 1995 that "during the Cold War, NATO's command posts were maintained on constant alert, ready to launch an all-out attack throughout Europe. I think that reducing their number and scope of operations would be noted by Moscow as a confidence-building step". This example shows that both parties were trapped for long by mutual suspicion resulting in the arms race, "muscle-flexing", and showdown of strength in military parades and on weapons ranges and maps. Certainly, there was full awareness that, given the available nuclear arms stockpiles, starting a new great war would be both a murderous and suicidal act. This does not mean

that the danger of war was excluded. International tensions, local conflicts, emergencies, provocations or warning system failures could make the situation uncontrollable and turn the Cold War into a “hot” war. That was a real danger. Bogging down in the arms race was another danger, especially for the Eastern bloc. Yet the one who would resolve to say ‘enough’ would face a difficult mission to accomplish. This would mean stemming the tide and opposing different lobbies — bureaucratic, military, and industrial. That was the policy Mikhail Gorbachev took up and the burden he shouldered. I do not have any documents and notes of numerous talks, meetings, and conferences held within the Warsaw Treaty Organization and between the two blocs. But one thing is clear: it was a step-by-step process — through doubts and obstacles — toward confidence building and arms limitation.

In May 1987, the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states adopted the Organization’s Military Doctrine. The document called upon NATO to conduct joint consultations to compare, analyze, and consider both alliances’ military doctrines mindful of the need to eliminate continuing mutual suspicion and mistrust for a better mutual understanding and defensive character of the blocs’ concepts and doctrines. The subjects of the proposed consultations could also include the imbalances and asymmetries in concrete types of weapons and armed forces and a quest for ways of their removal pursuant to the principle of an advanced party’s limitation, for such limitations would further lead to lower levels. The Warsaw Treaty member states proposed that such consultations be conducted by both parties’ authoritative military experts and expressed their willingness to start them as early as 1987. It was a bold, far-reaching, and indeed revolutionary initiative. I will take the liberty of noting that Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in his book *Life and Reforms* (Chapter 32), “Arms limitation was among the topical issues I discussed with Jaruzelski. The Polish leader’s way of thinking with regard to the key problems of defense and politics was close to mine. At that time I was very busy preparing for major talks with the West on arms limitation.” I do remember that Mikhail Sergeyevich was determined to foster the process. The Vienna talks where the parties put their chips on the table were an unprecedented event, a

giant step toward mutual confidence. It led to concrete decisions and practical solutions that abated the arms race and resulted in a historic breakthrough amid the Cold War.

I have so far presented the situation in general terms, from the viewpoint of arms and disarmament issues. But the mental barriers, which had developed for decades, were no less serious than those materialized in missiles, tanks, and planes. A turning point required a new thinking, a decisive moral and mental impetus. As Mikhail Gorbachev said, “it was necessary to transcend from the philosophy of hostility to a philosophy of mutual dependence.” Here mutual confidence was the starting point. Gorbachev was doing his best to build it. His legal education and logical exactitude, his humanitarian expertise and frankness, and, first and foremost, his aspiration and ability to understand his partner — all this made a deep impression after the previous Soviet leaders’ long conservative and sluggish rule.

The word *perestroika* was the symbol of changes in the Soviet Union. Its true essence extended, however, much farther. There was now a new political climate. I felt it myself along with other politicians. In fact, everybody in Poland felt a new spirit of mutual relations evolving toward partnership. Perestroika helped the Soviet Union keep away from various expensive projects outside Europe. It stepped up and expanded international contacts and cooperation. Greater openness revealed many gaps and faults. As a result, the Cold War was gradually losing ground. Dialectically speaking, the number of confidence-building factors transformed into a new quality manifest in détente and international cooperation.

The Malta Summit of December 1989 was a key event in the process. Shortly after it, Mikhail Sergeyevich informed the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee about its results at a meeting in Moscow. I do not remember its details. I am sure they can be found in relevant documents. What I do remember was that the talks with President Bush were frank and constructive in essence. They gave a chance for further major steps toward a more intensive and deeper process of confidence building, arms limitation, and disarmament.

I will allow myself a small personal digression regarding the gradual “defreezing” of Poland’s relations with the West, especially the USA, in the second half of the ‘80s. Two visits by George Bush to Poland in September 1987 (as US Vice President) and in July 1989 (as US President) were significant events. I have a warm remembrance of our long meetings. They contributed to democratic reforms and mutual confidence as part of East-West relations understood in a broader sense. These events took place in the environment created by Gorbachev: profound changes in the Eastern bloc states (except in Rumania) by way of evolution, without revolutions and bloodshed.

There has been a wide range of opinion expressed by politicians, historians, and publicists with regard to the character and driving forces of those changes. Guided by their political likes and dislikes, they praise some and underestimate others or even try to measure the percentage of political leaders’ contribution to the process. Dickering over who’s better is pointless. I am positive that a weighted and unbiased appraisal unencumbered by political emotions will be made in the course of time. The historical changes and, consequently, the end of the Cold War result from the process in which, as I said, the subjective factor had played a significant part: people, governments, NGOs, and, especially, political and spiritual leaders. It would suffice to mention Ronald Reagan and George Bush; the government reforms, especially in Poland and partly in Hungary; Solidarity Trade Union and Lech Wa??sa; and dissidents in different countries. Neither should we ignore the efforts made by the church and first and foremost, the role of Pope John Paul II, whose influence on the developments in Poland and, indirectly, in other countries was quite strong.

To summarize the above, I can say that there were many factors and currents in the mainstream of expectations and strivings for democratization and democratic international relations. Yet there was a formidable obstacle to progress: conservative traditions and views and the interests of different forces safeguarding the past. I often mention the Russian proverb: “Water never flows under settled stones”. It was necessary to lift those stones to remove the obstacle. Gorbachev did that bravely, supported by progressive Soviet civilian and military representatives. I am happy

to say that his initiatives and practical steps were met with sympathy and support in Poland.

Paying a worthy tribute to all those in the East and in the West who fought for years for freedom, democracy, and sovereignty, against East-West antagonisms, it should be noted that Mikhail Gorbachev played a key role in those events. His effort was priceless and far-reaching. If he had not lifted the ‘stones’, history may have taken a different course: either tremendous setbacks with unpredictable consequences, which would have had a continuous negative, destabilizing effect on the international situation or an explosion that would have triggered off a European or global catastrophe. Luckily, this did not happen. Despite certain setbacks, the Cold War, the curse of Europe and the world, sank into oblivion. That is the point. This is what we should remember first and foremost today, on Mikhail Gorbachev’s 75th birthday.

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Edited by
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Olga Zdravomyslova

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